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AIRLINE MERGERS, MONOPOLY, AND THE CAB
By RICHARD J. BARBIER'
N 1961 the eleven American trunk airlines reported an aggregate loss
$of$34.8 million.' This elementary, but important fact (coming on the
heels of a modest $68,000 profit in 1960) sums up the various depressing
forces that have been at work in the industry within recent years. The
introduction of the jets, beginning in 1959, meant a substantial increase
in capacity as well as large capital outlays. Total industry debt rose to
more than $1.3 billion, and interest payments alone climbed to $59
million in 1961 (up from $16 million in 1957). Passenger traffic, how-
ever, did not increase sufficiently either to fill the additional seats which
had been made available or, even at higher fares, to offset the resulting
increase in expenses. In 1960 revenue passenger miles carried by the trunk
airlines grew by only 3.9%, in 1961 by 1.1%. By contrast, during these
two years available seat miles increased by nearly 14%. As a result the
passenger load factor was reduced to 56.2%. And, further, more passen-
gers made use of coach-class service, some 57.8% of all passenger miles
flown in 1961.
Between 1958 and 1961 total operating revenues of the trunk airlines
increased by about a third (from $1.5 billion to $2 billion), but operating
expenses advanced by about 44% (from $1.4 billion to a little over $2
billion). Earnings fell sharply in 1960 and went into the red in 1961.
Naturally the rate of return on investments has fallen steeply, reaching
1.3% in 1961 (as defined by the Civil Aeronautics Board [CAB]) -far
below the level officially considered reasonable and adequate (a year ago
it was determined that for the trunk airlines a fair return on investment
is 10.5%).'
Whether the economic situation of the industry is as bleak as some
spokesmen suggest, however, and whether it is any more than a temporary
condition that will be alleviated in large measure by improved circum-
stances beginning this year, are vital issues that have not been adequately
appraised so far in the search for a remedy to what has simply been as-
sumed to be a basic malady. At any rate, the agents of the larger airlines
and the Chairman of the CAB, among others, have portrayed the plight
of the industry in El Greco hues: all is dire, and something must be done
soon if the industry is not either to flounder into bankruptcy or to re-
quire Federal subsidy again. Of what this action should consist, though,
is not clear. A few advocates, such as the President of Continental Air
Lines, feel that the proper step at this time is lower fares, an economy
t Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
'Air Transport Association of America, Facts and Figures About Air Transportation, 16-17,
28 (23rd ed. 1962) [hereafter 1962 ATA Facts & Figures]. The other data contained in the
opening paragraphs are also taken from this source. A more complete examination of the financial
situation is contained in part I infra.
'Net income before interest and after taxes as a percentage of net worth and long-term debt.
a General Passenger Fare Investigation, 1A Av. L. Rep. 5 21,236 (1961).
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rate up to 25 % below prevailing coach tariffs. The industry rather gen-
erally repudiates this approach to the problem (Continental at first
withdrew its fare proposal, largely in response to the cold reaction it
received from the CAB) ;' most of the carriers, in fact, believe that higher
fares are in order, designed so as to raise coach rates from 75 % to
83-85% of first class rates as well as to boost the overall fare level." Their
reaction thus is to boost fares and, apparently assuming little or no de-
mand price elasticity,6 increase revenue enough to once more generate
fair profits.
At root, however, the larger airline officials and their government
counterparts feel that mergers provide the only real answer to the in-
dustry's needs (needs, I repeat, which are pictured as critical and other-
wise incapable of satisfaction). In this quest they have received particular
encouragement from Chairman Alan Boyd of the CAB. Speaking at
Hartford last November, he expressed the "hope that others of the eleven
domestic trunk lines now in existence will merge in the future. . . Time
may be running out for some carriers to receive what they and their
investors consider to be a fair price for merging into other companies. It
is altogether possible that financial conditions in the industry may become
worse before they become better than they are now. Time is of the
essence here, and there is little or none to waste."' The same theme has
run through several of his other addresses; in 1960 he said "it is entirely
possible that a series of mergers or consolidations might be beneficial to
the trunk-line industry and in the public interest."' Again, in June of this
year Chairman Boyd, perhaps with more reserve, stated that "in some
situations it does appear that mergers may be accomplished that will save
a great deal of expense and still provide the traveling public with a good
transport system."' One reporter concluded that these statements amount
to an authoritative "carte blanche for airlines interested in merging.""
4 New York Times, Oct. 31, 1961, p. 61, col. 5.
'For a review of the various airline positions, see New York Times, Nov. 16, 1961, p. 78,
col. 4. Virtually all favor a general increase in fares, beyond the prevailing level (which
incorporates a 3% increase placed in effect on February 1, 1962). Braniff and American are
particularly strong advocates of narrowing the first-class coach differential. Eastern is in an
anomalous position; although it criticized the Continental economy fare plan and generally
favors higher fares, it has aggressively expanded its air-shuttle and air-bus services-both
involving fares below coach levels. The CAB suspended the Continental economy rate, pending
further study; then the airline withdrew its proposal. New York Times, Jan. 30, 1962, p. 46, col. 7.
It resubmitted a similar plan later in 1962.
6"'Demand price elasticity" refers simply to the relative effect of a change in price on the
quantity of the goods or service demanded. If price is raised 10% and demand falls by 10%,
the elasticity is said to be -1. If demand does not change, elasticity is zero-a very uncommon
situation. See generally Stigler, Theory of Price, ch. 3-4 (rev. ed. 1952).
'New York Times, Nov. 4, 1961, p. 46, col. 1. History suggests that whenever the industry
gets into financial difficulty the Board dashes forth with a bottle of merger medicine. In 1949
and 1950, just after a period of airline deficits, the CAB began a study looking to "the possibility,
feasibility, and desirability of bringing about a merger of air carriers where such mergers would
result in the improvement of the structure of the air transportation map of this country . . ."
1950 C.A.B. Ann. Rep. 2. See also its Statement of Policy Respecting Economic Program of
1949 for a similar expression favorable to trunkline mergers.
'As quoted in Public Utilities Fortnightly, Sept. 14, 1961, p. 487.
'New York Times, June 12, 1962, p. 51, col. 1.
"' New York Times, Feb. 4, 1962, § 10, p. 1, col. 6-8. On Sept. 28, 1961, Mr. Boyd met
with the presidents of all the trunk carriers to discuss the economic situation and to compare
their fare and rate "philosophy." It is believed that the Chairman may also have outlined his
attitude to mergers; indeed, much of the trade discussion relative to this matter has been
noted since the date of this meeting. Aviation Week, Sept. 18, 1961, pp. 38-39.
AIRLINE MERGERS
Whether that is true remains to be seen-and we shouldn't have too long
to wait.
Prodded by the CAB and inspired by the businessman's inherent desire
to reduce the vigor of the competitive struggle, several major airlines are
actively engaged in the merger movement. Excepting the United-Capital
merger approved in 1961 (which, because of Capital's bankrupt condi-
tion, places it in a distinct category), the most important of the mergers
in process involves American and Eastern Air Lines, the second and fourth
largest domestic carriers (together accounting for about a third of truck
revenue passenger miles in 1961). Approval of their merger has already
been formally sought from the CAB, and hearings have recently been
concluded. 1 On June 19 the CAB authorized the Hughes Tool Company,
which has legal title to 78% of TWA's stock, to acquire 56% of North-
east's common stock from the Atlas Corporation;" this brings a merger
of these two lines one long step closer to realization, though it should be
noted they are presently in close liaison since Northeast is using jet equip-
ment leased from TWA for which it is not meeting current rental pay-
ments. And waiting in the wings, so to speak, are a number of other
prospective consolidations. Precisely who will be involved in what marriage
remains a subject for trade speculation. But the possibilities include a
merger of TWA with Pan American (or with others, such as Delta or
Northwest); of United with Western; and, among others, Braniff with
Continental. Several observers of the scene contemplate a string of
mergers that will produce five or six surviving trunk lines."
Clearly, then, there is a trend to mergers among the trunk airlines,
one that is certain to be accentuated greatly if the American-Eastern
application is approved. What is distressingly unclear, however, is the
need and desirability of the various consolidations that are contemplated.
Perhaps they will have private advantage, though even here a question
can be raised; but to the extent they do, there is likely to be serious public
detriment. Competition will be reduced (and this quality has far greater
utility than many commentators acknowledge) and the imbalance that
prevails within the industry-with four carriers now accounting for over
70% of passenger traffic, the remainder divided among seven other par-
ticipants-is perpetuated, if not actually emphasized. No doubt consoli-
dation can produce some benefits, but in considerable measure these appear
attainable without outright merger of the carriers themselves (the amalga-
mation of terminal facilities is one that comes immediately to mind).
At this point in the merger movement neither the carriers themselves
nor their regulators have spelled out with any acceptable degree of
precision the criteria that are relevant in appraising petitions for consolida-
tion. In his Hartford speech last November, Chairman Boyd, after urging
" Hearings before the examiner finished on June 19. Post-hearing briefs were due on July 24
and rebuttal briefs on August 2. A decision is expected in the fall. New York Times, June 21,
1962, p. 48, col. 3.
" New York Times, June 20, 1962, p. 1, co1. 2. The Board felt that the only alternative for
Northeast (whose current liabilities exceed its current assets by over $11 million on Nov. 30,
1961) was bankruptcy and possible reorganization, which it deemed unacceptable.
"Robert Six, President of Continental Airlines, is of this opinion. New York Times, June 2,
1962, p. 34, col. 6. And the travel editor of the New York-Times has outlined his plan for
combining the various domestic airlines (including some of the local service operations) into
about five systems. New York Times, Feb. 4, 1962, § 10, p. 1, col. 6-8; p. 19, col. 5. For a
review of the trade rumors, see Newsweek, May 14, 1962, p. 88.
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the airlines to consider more mergers, said "it is my personal view that
if the carriers will not act soon in their own interests and in that of the
public, the Board should institute studies of its own to develop detailed
criteria for mergers and to determine what carriers should merge in the
better interest of the industry and the nation."" This is a bit like urging
your son to go get married in order to solve his problems, but adding that
the wisdom of marriage will have to be assessed subsequently. And it is
a kind of cart-before-the-horse approach that is noticeable in other recent
governmental pronouncements. The Project Horizon Report (of the Task
Force on National Aviation Goals) spoke of airline mergers or "ap-
propriate route adjustments" as "the only solution" to the economic plight
of certain of the trunkline carriers;" continuing, it declared that "mergers
which result in strengthening marginal carriers, eliminating uneconomic
competition, and providing new and/or improved service to the public
should be encouraged." Yet after offering this vague comment, the Report
then goes on to propose an "examination of future requirements and the
creation of some standards for mergers.""6 This is absurd; it makes little
sense to recommend mergers as a solution for a problem, itself in-
adequately analysed, without first determining whether this treatment is
efficiently related to the disease and whether other approaches might not
offer substantially equivalent relief with less likelihood of public detri-
ment. Perhaps the President recognized this, for in his April 5 message
on "The Transportation System of Our Nation," he admitted that "this
administration has a responsibility to recommend more specific guidelines
than are now available and more specific procedures for applying them."'"
Accordingly he appointed an interagency group' to develop such criteria
and to evaluate "each pending merger in transportation," having as one
objective the maintenance of "effective competition" (undefined) "among
alternative forms of transportation, and where traffic volume permits,
between competing firms in the same mode of transportation."' " The
ability of the group to translate these admonitions into concrete per-
formance will be interesting to observe. At the moment, however, one
is forced to the conclusion that key government officials are urging the
airlines to consider merger but admitting they now lack the criteria to
assess properly the merit of any given application.
While the regulators are lacking in a basis for their judgment, execu-
tives of the larger airlines, generally speaking, are confident that mergers
offer the solution to their financial difficulties. While they admit that
many factors are involved in their present plight, excessive competition
is singled out as the real culprit. In its trial brief for the proceeding
" New York Times, Nov. 4, 1961, p. 46, col. 1.
"' Federal Aviation Agency, Report of the Task Force on National Aviation Goals: Project
Horizon 180 (Sept. 1961). The Chairman of the eight-man Task Force was formerly an official
for two of the trunk airlines; the Vice-Chairman had been vice-president of the Air Transport
Association of America; one of the other members was previously assistant general counsel for
the Air Transport Association.
" Id. at 181.
" Message from the President of the United States, The Transportation System of Our
Nation, H.R. Doc. No, 384, 87th C6ng., 2d Sess. 8 (April 5, 1962).
"A five-member committee has been appointed. It consists of the Secretary of Commerce
for Transportation (Chairman), a member of the Council of Economic Advisers, an Assistant
Secretary of Labor, the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, and the chief of the Justice
Department's public counsel section. New York Times, May 16, 1962, p. 53, col. 6.
1s Supra note 17, at p. 8.
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American Airlines says flatly "that the increased level of competition and
the consequent inevitable provision of excess capacity is chiefly respon-
sible for the industry's present state is clear.""0 Since 195 5 the CAB has in-
creased the degree of competition on most routes which formerly had
provided the major carriers with cream for their operations. The effect
has been to expose great chunks of the Big Four's previously mono-
polistic preserves to the competitive inroads of the smaller trunk operators.
As American interprets it this increased competition is the principal cause
of its (and the industry's) weakening position. Thus there is only one
proper response: permit mergers to reduce this competition. Of course,
it sees in merger other gains; facilities can be combined, flight equipment
more efficiently utilized, and capital requirements significantly reduced.
Consolidation hence will reduce competition and permit more effective
and fuller exploitation of expensive equipment, with a consequent re-
duction in unit costs. In a nutshell, that is the heart of its argument. If
true, the case for mergers is an impressive one.
Closer analysis, however, supports the belief that contemplated trunk
airline mergers, specifically that between American and Eastern, are
undesirable, unnecessary to the realization of operating economies, and
poorly related to the industry's recent financial troubles. This is not to
say that mergers, by curtailing competition, might not offer some in-
direct economic aid to the surviving airlines. What it suggests is that the
price paid by the public, through the consequent reduction in competition
and overall increase in concentration, is far too high.
Regardless of the conclusions reached, one fact, nevertheless, stands
out: mergers cannot be intelligently appraised without a full appreciation
of the relevant financial characteristics (the subject of part I), the struc-
ture of the airline industry, and the CAB's post-1955 efforts to increase
the degree of competition over many routes and to achieve a lower level
of concentration (part II). Only when these facts are digested can one
sensibly evaluate the nature and implications of a specific merger-such
as American-Eastern (part III). While the general conclusion of this
article is that the case for airline mergers is unproven, part IV indicates
that this is not a time for complacency on the part either of the airlines
themselves or the CAB. Although carrier profits should turn up this
year, if this does not happen and if more aggressive fare manipulation
does not improve the situation, more drastic action may be required. Yet
even if this requires some curtailment in competition (a point open to
dispute), mergers do not appear to be the best way of achieving this goal.
I. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TRUNK AIRLINE INDUSTRY
As put forth by the proponents the case for airline mergers emanates
from two principal hypotheses: first, that the trunk airline industry is
in serious financial condition and cannot survive, absent basic structural
reorganization or outside assistance; second, that mergers provide the best
0 Trial Brief for American Airlines, In the Matter of the Application of American Airlines
and Eastern Air Lines for Approval of Merger, CAB Docket No. 13355, p. 11. This theme runs
through a number of exhibits which it presented. In particular, see exhibits AE-F, AE-1 51/155,
166-67. [All subsequent references to exhibits are to this same proceeding.] The parallel line of
argument advanced by Eastern Air Lines is spelled out in its Merger Proxy Statement, March 12,
1962, passim.
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solution to the industry's difficulties. This section deals primarily with the
first of these two main arguments.
Viewed in broad financial terms the recent performance of the trunk
airline industry has been highly disappointing. This was particularly true
in 1961, though 1960 was not a great deal better. The surface indicia
of this distress are easily recounted. While passenger capacity rose (on
an available seat mile basis) by 7.4% in 1960 and by 6.9% in 1961,21
reflecting the high-rate of jet delivery and introduction into service (there
are now about 300 four-engine jets in domestic use),"z passenger traffic
increased only modestly. The number of revenue passenger miles flown
in 1960 increased by 3.9% and in 1961 by only 1.1%. With increasingly
more passenbers flying by coach (in 1961 some 57.8% of all traffic
carried), offsetting somewhat the higher fares which had been placed in
effect, total operating revenue rose by only about 5% in 1961. Operating
expenses increased somewhat more, and, in conjunction with nonoperating
charges (notably interest on long term debt), total costs for the first
time since 1947 ran ahead of revenues. The result: a net loss for the
eleven carriers of $34.8 million, down from the small $68,000 profit
recorded in 1960."3 The return on investment (as that is defined by the
CAB and the airlines)24 declined from 2.8% in 1960 to 1.3% in 1961,
far below what the Board determined in 1961 to be a reasonable return-
namely, 10.5% for the trunk airlines as a group (10.25% for the Big
Four, 11.1251% for the rest.)2 So described the situation is indeed dire.
But a look under the industry blanket reveals certain facts that some-
what brighten the scene. For one thing, about half of the 1961 deficit
was accounted for by TWA, and most of its losses in turn were incurred
through its international rather than its domestic operations." Another
$9.5 million of the overall 1961 loss was reported by Northeast Airlines,
which has been on the verge of bankruptcy for so long that its 1961
experience reflects no change in events. The fate of National Airlines,
which for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1961, as a whole lost $7.3
million, demonstrates further that the industry's losses were heavily con-
centrated in the first half of the year (roughly coinciding with the
return of economic recovery)." As well, if the performance of these three
airlines, along with Eastern's, is separated from the whole one finds that
the other seven had a combined net profit of $23 million.
: 1962 ATA Facts and Figures 17.
2 1962 ATA Facts and Figures 34. The number has increased rapidly, though it has slackened
this year-for reasons that will be brought out later in the text. On Jan. 1, 1960, there were
84 four-engine jets in operation; by Jan. 1, 1961, the number had increased to 202. Forecasts
called for a further increase to 301 by Jan. 1, 1962, and to 385 by 1963. Thereafter increases
will be small-400 by the beginning of 1964. Federal Aviation Agency, Aviation Forecasts: Fiscal
Years 1962-1967, table 3 (Oct. 1961). [There is some slight disparity as to the number of
jets in service on Jan. 1, 1961, between the preceding source and Federal Aviation Agency,
Statistical Handbook of Aviation 38 (1961 ed.).]
" For a more detailed breakdown of individual revenue and expense items, see 1962 ATA
Facts and Figures 24-28.
24 See supra note 2.
11 See supra note 3.
" Braniff Airways, which operates flights to South America, is not unlike TWA in this
respect. In 1961 Braniff recorded a profit of 670 a share on its domestic operations but lost
240 a share on its international service. Standard and Poor's Current Air Transport Survey,
March 15, 1962, p. A27.
"' National's new president and controlling stockholder estimates that for the current fiscal
year the airline's operating revenues will be up. by as much as a third- compared with a year ago,
and that pre-tax earnings will be $2 a share. New York Times, June 21, 1962, p. 41, col. 2-3.
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Moreover, any accurate assessment of the situation requires allowance
for differences in the composition of the respective trunk airline capital
structures. While the industry generally has added significantly to its debt
since the arrival of the jet (debt made up about 29% of aggregate trunk
airline capitalization in 1955; by 1961, excluding Northeast Airlines, it
had increased to 66%)," this has been considerably more true of some
of the airlines than of others. This story is told well by their widely
varying debt equity ratios: American's is 2:1, Eastern's 1.95:1, TWA's
a whopping 3.25:1, and for the smaller airlines much lower-1.3:1 for
Continental and Delta, 1.1:1 for Braniff." As a result their relative
profitability-net profits as a percentage of net worth-takes on a dis-
tinctive hue. And even on an overall basis, if the net worth measure is
employed, their earnings look much better than may otherwise appear.
The reason is that the industry typically announces its rate of return on
an investment base that consists of both equity and long-term debt. This
in itself tends to over-emphasize the recent earnings downturn. In 1961,
a lean year, several of the airlines made respectable returns on their com-
mon stock equity-Delta 11%, Northwest 8.5%, American 5%.
'What customary industry financial reports hide, in particular, is the
growing importance of interest and depreciation charges. These reflect
the large additions of debt and purchases of jet equipment that have been
made since 1955. Interest charges have skyrocketed over this period, rising
from $6.9 million in 1955 to $58.6 million in 1961 (an increase of 850%,
the largest of any single expense item). Also, as the jet equipment has
been acquired, depreciation charges have mounted rapidly-up from $102
million in 1955 to $252 million in 1961. The relative magnitude of these
cost increases is seen in this table:
TABLE 1. INCREASES IN TRUNK AIRLINE EXPENSES, 1955-1961
Expense Category 1955 1961 Percentage
(in millions) Increase
Total operating expenses $1,010 $2,020 100%0
depreciation 102 252 150
general services and admin. 409 794 94
maintenance 196 400 104
flying operations 303 574 90
Interest on long term debt 7 59 850
Source: 1962 ATA Facts and Figures, pp. 26, 28.
"s Exhibit AE-D, appendix 18.
" Calculated from data in Aviation Week, May 14, 1962, p. 53. There is more than mere
financialsignificance in the heavy debt loads assumed by the larger airlines. With a small group
of banks and insurance companies having advanced most of the funds, the control they assume
over contemplated mergers presents a dangerous situation. This is particularly true when the
airlines and these financial groups tend indirectly to interlock through their boards of directors.
When high airline officials of American, for example, sit alongside the spokesmen for Eastern on
boards of directors of the financial institutions (e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank) which have
advanced both airlines large sums of money and which must approve any merger, one has a right
to be suspicious of the motives and circumstances leading to the decision to merge these two
giant air carriers. This matter has been examined more completely elsewhere. See, A Staff Report
to Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Judiciary Committee, Proposed Merger of Eastern Air Lines
and American Airlines, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-33 (1962). For a more colorful account see
Transport Workers Union of America, The Big Grab 3-9 (1962).
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While depreciation is treated as an expense just like payments for jet fuel
or wages, and has been rising much more rapidly than other cost com-
ponents, it does not involve an actual cash withdrawal; rather it tends to
depress earnings in a misleading fashion in the more recent years. Further,
inconsistencies in depreciation rates greatly distort actual financial per-
formance. As an illustration, in 1961 American and Eastern claimed
about the same amount of depreciation, $38 million. But Eastern is de-
preciating its jet equipment on the basis of an estimated useful life of
10 years and a residual value of 10%, while American is using 12 years
and 15%." On a hypothetical cost of $100 this means that American is
taking $7.08 per year in depreciation (on a straight-line basis) as com-
pared with $9 in the case of Eastern. The effect is to depress Eastern's
net earnings (or accentuate American's, if you prefer) and contributes
heavily to the book losses it has claimed during the last two years. Indeed,
according to one source, if certain changes in accounting practices which
Eastern has adopted recently had been in effect during the period 1954-
1956, its net earnings would have been in excess of $50 million instead of
the reported $35 million.'
The pronounced increase in depreciation taken by the trunk airlines
in the past three years means that corporate cash flow has been soaring
enormously. As of September 30, 1961, their total retained earnings came
to $308 million, with aggregate depreciation adding about $1.2 billion.2
The scale of these amounts can be gauged by comparing cash flow per
share with earnings per common share for the year 1961.
TABLE 2. TRUNK AIRLINE CASH FLOW AND EARNINGS, 1961
(per common share)












* Fiscal year ended June 30, 1961.
t Excludes special write-off.
Source: Forbes, May 1, 1962, p. 23
The growth of the companies' cash flow has many important implica-
tions. 3 It tends to reduce the practical significance of net earnings as an
" Eastern Proxy Statement, March 12, 1962, pp. 36, 43. For tax purposes depreciation is
calculated at a faster rate.
"Exhibit DL 30, p. 17 (presented by Delta Airlines).
32 1962 ATA Facts and Figures 30.
"Of course, the great increase in cash flow has had general applicability (though typically
it has been a good bit less pronounced than in the case of the trunk airlines). Corporate profits
have not quite doubled over the last 1 years; but the total of retained earnings and depreciation
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index to financial well-being. Corporations can literally live off their cash
flow. At the end of 1966, for example, Eastern Air Lines could have
working capital of over $83 million-after paying cash of some $200
million for 40 Boeing 727's that it has on order." Even though this as-
sumes that Eastern will make full use of its presently-indicated borrowing
power, this still represents a sharp increase in its working capital, which
amounted to $18.6 million at the end of 1961. The explanation for this
magical feat lies principally in the swelling depreciation charges it will
be claiming throughout the period. Simlarly, internally-generated cash
will pay for Braniff's fourth Boeing 720 and for six BAC-111 short range
jet transports to be delivered in 1964 and 1965."' Again the reason lies
in depreciation charges; in 1963 these alone will amount to $8.5 million,
or $3.75 million more than anticipated debt and interest payments.
With the trunk airlines having such substantial cash flow it is mis-
leading to confine one's attention simply to the carriers' net earnings. This
hides from view the very qualities that most financial students consider
to be most important in assessing a firm's financial health. Actually the
airlines, as well as most corporations, are a good deal better off than their
profit claims indicate. This does not necessarily mean that airline earnings
are now adequate, but it does suggest that their malady is not nearly so
serious as at first appears.
If the airlines' 1960 and 1961 financial showing is indicative of future
performance, however, there is nevertheless some cause for concern. But
analysis of the situation suggests that the past two years were atypical
and do not provide a useful guide to the future. There are many reasons
for this conclusion. For one thing, the past five years have contained two
sharp recessions, each roughly a year long. Both were severe and reflected
a sizeable drop in the level of business activity. From 1957 to 1958 the
Industrial Production Index fell by 7o; from January, 1960, to Feb-
ruary, 1961, the Index fell by over 8%.o Since the airlines depend on
business travel for the bulk of their revenue, it is only reasonable to
suspect a correlation between the movements of the economic cycle and
airline traffic. And increasingly this hypothesized relationship seems to
be confirmed. Although during the two earliest postwar recessions, 1948-
1949 and 1953-1954, traffic continued to increase substantially, this has
not been true more recently. In 1958 revenue passenger miles did not
increase at all over 1957 (when there had been a 13.6% increase). In
1959, with cyclical recovery, traffic rose sharply, by over 15 %; but then
with the return of recession in 1960 the rate of growth fell once more,
so the passenger traffic rose by only 3.9%-and by only 1.1% in 1961 (a
year only partially marked by an upswing)." Like most everyone else
in the United States the airline industry has clearly been the victim of
a low rate of economic growth and of increasingly shorter periods of
("cash flow") has more than doubled. Depreciation allowances now are equal to about 80%
of plant and equipment expenditures compared with 33%o in the late 1940's. Bookman, The New
Anatomy of Business Profits, Fortune, May 1962, p. 107, 108-09.
34 Exhibit DL 37B.
aa Aviation Week, April 2, 1962, p. 35.
" Economic Report of the President, January 1962, table B-32. Ian. 1960, table D-29.
37 1962 ATA Facts and Figures 17.
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recovery. 8 Its fortunes cannot be separated from the movements of the
economy as a whole any more than those of the steel industry. When
the economy is anemic, so too will be airline earnings.
But the failure of airline passenger traffic to grow more rapidly than
it has since 1959 is attributable to more than economic recession. Fares
have gone up sharply during the last four years, by about 25 % (depend-
ing on the exact measure used) from 1958 through and including the 3 %
increase approved by the CAB this year. This is a point which the Air
Transport Association, the certificated airlines' trade association, zealously
attempts to disguise. But the fact remains that average revenue per pas-
senger mile collected by the domestic scheduled airlines has increased by
over 21% since 1958 as compared with a rise of only 3.4% in the Con-
sumer Price Index." Not unexpectedly this has meant increasingly more
intensive use of coach class service and, it would also seem, a decline in
the rate of traffic growth. Certainly it would be a terribly unusual market
if demand were not to respond negatively to such steep price increases
(airline spokesmen have a propensity for assuming, usually, that demand
elasticity is zero; this is absurd, of course). The way in which airline fares
have increased can best be illustrated as in the following table:
TABLE 3. ILLUSTRATIVE FARE INCREASES, 1954-1962
(one-way fares, tax excluded)
New York-Los Angeles New York-Chicago
First Cl. Coach First Cl. Coach
July 1954 $158.85 $ 99.00 $45.10 $33.00
July 1957 158.85 99.00 45.10 33.00
July 1958 166.25 104.00 47.95 35.35
July 1959 166.25 104.00 47.95 35.35
Add for Jet 10.00 10.00 3.00 3.00
July 1960 171.45 109.15 50.15 38.30
Add for Jet 10.00 10.00 3.00 3.00
July 1961 171.45 109.15 50.15 38.30
Add for Jet 10.00 10.00 3.00 3.00
June 1962 176.60 112.45 51.70 39.45
Add for Jet 10.30 32.65 3.05 3.25
Source: Oficial Airline Guide
"8 Since many people consider the discussion of growth rates academic, it is well to note the
close connection between rapid growth and high airline profits. From 1949 to 1955, a favorable
period for the airlines, the economy (gross national product in constant 1954 dollars) expanded
at an average annual rate of 5%. But from 1955 to 1959 the pace slowed to only 2% (and air-
line earnings, along with corporate profits generally, fell heavily). In 1959 the rate increased to
7%, and the trunk airlines earned nearly $62 million. But then the rate of advance slowed again,
to 2.9% (1960 compared with 1959) and then to 1.8% (1961 over 1960). Airline profits
tumbled too. With the upswing now in progress earnings once more are advancing. Report of the
Joint Economic Committee of Congress, Employment, Growth, and Price Levels, table 5, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); Economic Report of the President, January 1962, table B-3.
"9 Commenting on fares the ATA says, in carefully chosen public-relations type language, "the
fare for travel on the U.S. scheduled airline system continues to be an outstanding bargain. The
average 1961 air fare in the United States was 11.9% over the 1951 fare and just one penny per
passenger mile over the average 1938 fare. While air fares increased just 18.8% on the average
since 1938, the price of things generally, as measured by the consumer price index, increased
111.4%." 1962 ATA Facts and Figures 10. But if 1958 is used as the base year instead of
1938, then the average revenue per passenger mile has climbed from 5.640 to 6.280, up 21%
compared with 3.4% in the consumer price index. Moreover, coach fares, from 1951 to 1961,
have risen more than twice as fast as first class fares when figured on an average revenue per
passenger mile basis. Ibid. This is even more true of short hauls than of longer hauls. See New York
Times, March 11, 1962, S 10, p. 5, col. 3-4 (letter from an ATA vice-president).
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Actually this table tends to understate the extent of fare increases; for
example, in 1959, the major airlines operated a significant amount of
propeller service between the points indicated, so that there was a real
choice between jet and prop flights. This is no longer true; between New
York and Los Angeles and New York and Chicago the principal carrier,
American Airlines, offers nothing but jet service. The result is that the
traveler who could go from New York to Los Angeles via coach prop
equipment in 1959 for $104 now must pay $145.10.40
With such steep fare increases it is not surprising that the airline pas-
senger market has failed either to grow significantly in recent years or to
reach a broader segment of the populace. Recent surveys indicate that
roughly 80 % of the American people have never traveled by commercial
plane. And actually the airline passenger market is a good deal more
limited than even this would indicate. A survey conducted by Fortune
magazine showed that the 59% of passengers interviewed who were
traveling on business accounted for 87% of the trips taken by all pas-
sengers. Moreover, "heavy business travelers" (those who took more than
31 air trips over a nine-month period) accounted for 80% of the trips.41
What this means obviously is that the airlines are concentrating the bulk
of their attention on a very small segment of the potential market. Since
business travelers are likely to be less responsive to fare increases (virtually
all of this kind of expenditure is tax deductible, with a significant amount
of it no doubt fully paid for by the taxpayers since it is chargeable to
government contracts), it is probable that this is the only reason why
the airlines have not sustained an actual decline in traffic growth over the
past three years. Indeed the fact that traffic has continued to expand,
though only slightly, in the face of the recent fare increases, actually ap-
pears to have kept the carriers themselves from recognizing that the
market for airline travel is excessively constricted. At the core of the
airlines' problem lies a lack of passenger traffic; 42 certainly this will not
be cured with continuing fare increases. Yet only Continental Air Lines
has been "daring" enough to propose a sharp price cut-in the form of
an economy service at 25% below coach rates. The rest of the industry
believes in higher fares and in a narrower gap between coach and first
class tariffs. This seems to be the ideal way to curtail traffic growth and
to prevent enlargement of the market. Again, one wonders whether mer-
gers are the answer to the industry's troubles, or whether the solution in
fact doesn't lie within its own domain.
There are still other reasons why much of the blame for the trunk in-
dustry's recent performance can be laid at its own door. One of the super-
ficial causes of the carriers' current difficulty is found in their extensive
jet equipment acquisitions. Not only did this greatly increase available
capacity, but it meant a sharp rise in debt and in related interest and de-
preciation charges. When orders for the four-engine jet equipment were
40 The 5o round trip discount, in effect until 1959, has also been eliminated.
" Fortune Airlines Study, p. 4. A similar study, conducted on behalf of American Airlines
by the Opinion Research Corporation, showed that 78% of the American people have never
flown on a commercial airline and that the 157o of air travelers who take five or more trips a
year account for 64% of total air trips. Aviation Week, Feb. 26, 1962, p. 47. On the passenger
travel market, generally, see Cherington, Airline Price Policy 30-41 (1958).
42 If the passenger load factor had been just one point higher in 1961 than it was (57.2%
instead of 56.2%), gross revenues would have increased by about $32 million.
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being placed in 1956 (deliveries began in 1959) one business analyst con-
cluded that the purchases were unjustified by predicted passenger traffic
increases. In fact, concluded this writer, if traffic were to grow as was
predicted and if all then-existing passenger equipment were kept in use
and if the jet equipment were operated as many hours as the old equip-
ment with seating space divided equally between first and coach class,
the 1961 load factor would have been 38o." As it turned out the actual
load factor was 56.2o, reflecting, not a rise in traffic (indeed the 1956
traffic projections were highly accurate), but the earlier retirement from
passenger service of piston equipment, slower than anticipated jet de-
liveries, and less intensive utilization of the new planes. The major trunk
lines, American in particular, jumped into the jet market with near-
reckless abandon (the President of American Airlines, C. R. Smith, ap-
pears now to recognize this)."' The smaller carriers were more cautious,
and Continental, for one, believes that if more efficiently used, American
could operate with ten fewer 707's and 720's than it had in 1961 (as of
March 5, 1962, American owned 48 planes of these types)."' Whether this
be true or not, it is clear that in purchasing the larger and far more
expensive jet equipment the airlines took a considerably more optimistic
view of the market than was warranted. (It is rather interesting now to
note the gloomy outlook foreseen by American and Eastern executives;
they appear to oscillate between all-out optimism when new jet equip-
ment is ordered and full-scale pessimism when mergers are being pressed.)
In addition, the new equipment has been used to provide as frequent
service as was the case when piston planes were in use, despite their
capacity differences (in terms of size and speed). The carriers argue that
ticket sales correlate to the number of flights offered and not to the
capacity of the aircraft. Result: proportionately more flights are now
offered with the larger, faster jet planes than with the older, smaller,
slower piston planes. Given only a modestly expanding demand the effect
obviously is a declining load factor.
There are a number of other factors that make the 1960-1961 per-
formance a poor basis for predicting future airline industry financial
results. Strikes in both years seriously affected several of the trunk car-
riers, taking a particularly heavy toll in the case of Eastern and TWA.
The large-scale work stoppage in February, 1961, resulted in an overall
revenue loss for the industry of $12 million, equal to about a third of the
aggregate deficit for the entire year. Accompanying these revenue curtail-
ments have been certain special expenditures. The most serious of these
stemmed from the necessity of modifying the Electra; this took several
months and in the interim the plane had to be operated at suboptimal
speed, with the effect of sharply increased operating costs (up from 168.7
per mile in the first quarter of 1960 to 191.70 in the second quarter).
Eastern Airlines, whch had 39 Electras in service, was especially hard hit;
in fact all of its planes were not back in service until mid-Summer 1961.
The Electra difficulties, of course, also affected the revenue side of the
picture, creating what the airlines insist was anti-flying sentiment among
43 Saunders, The Airlines' Flight from Reality, Fortune, Feb. 1956, p. 91. Said this writer:
"Bluntly, there is no visible prospect of any such rapid increase in airline passenger traffic."
Id. at 222.
" As reported in Forbes, May 1, 1962, p. 23.
"' Exhibit CAL-Ri 5.
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many passengers. (Like so many airline claims this one lacks any accept-
able degree of specificity; but no doubt it contains some truth.)
While the trunk airlines' financial problems in the last few years are
less serious than may appear at first reading, admittedly there are some
legitimate bases for concern; even so, so many factors have been at work
during 1960 and 1961 that it is difficult to pinpoint the causes of their
troubles. Some have been uncontrollable and unpredictable (labor dis-
putes, accidents, equipment problems) ; others have been related to gen-
eral economic circumstances; some appear to lie largely within their own
control (rate increases that have chilled market development). A para-
mount question remains, however. Will the near-future be any more
favorable to the airlines and can earnings reasonably be expected to in-
crease in the years immediately ahead?
There are several reasons for believing that airline profits can be ex-
pected to turn up in the very near future. Jet operating costs have begun
to decline, offering clear promise that they will be the most efficient
operating flight equipment in airline history. In 1961 the total direct costs
(including depreciation) of operating the Boeing 707 averaged 176.99
per revenue mile and for the Douglas DC-8 181.550 per revenue mile;"
both cost levels were down from the prior year, bearing out the industry
view that it takes a period of experience before new equipment can be
operated most economically (in fact the DC-8 figure noted above repre-
sents a decline from 201.900 a year earlier, shortly after this type of
equipment had been introduced into service). The great economy of the
jet can most readily be appreciated by comparing it with, say, the Electra;
the latter's 1961 per revenue mile cost was 160.910, or a little less than
the pure jets. But the Electra has only 66 seats compared with 107 for the
Boeing 707 and 117 for the Douglas DC-8 (these being American Airline
seating configurations). The jet's seat mile costs are thus much lower,
and promise to decline still more, making it extremely probable that the
1961 industry breakeven load factor of 56.5% will fall noticeably in
1962. There are, in addition, other kinds of costs related to the introduc-
tion of the jet that are now out of the way-introductory costs of flight
simulator devices, repair equipment, etc. From now on the full advantage
of the jets can seemingly be exploited.
Moreover, 1962 represents a hiatus in jet equipment deliveries, promis-
ing therefore not only a decline in the rate of increase in capacity but
also a gradual slowing in added depreciation charges. As of June 20, 1961,
some 94 Boeing 707's (the first four-engine jet in service) had been de-
livered, with 16 more on order for delivery in fiscal 1962 (several of
these were actually delivered in calendar 1961) and fiscal 1963; the major
airlines (with the exception of TWA) tend to have completed their 707
acquisitions. (American is in this category for example, presently await-
ing some Convair 990's and the short and medium-ranged 727, scheduled
for fiscal 1964.)"' Likewise with the Boeing 720: fifty of these were in
service on June 30, 1961, another 42 were on order for delivery in fiscal
1962, and only three are on order for later delivery." Few of the Douglas
DC-8's, although somewhat longer coming into production, remain to
46 Aviation Week, March 13, 1961, p. 147; April 30, 1962, p. S5.
4"Eastern Proxy Statement, March 12, 1962, p. 22.
"a Federal Aviation Agency, Aviation Forecasts: Fiscal Years 1962-1967, table 2 (October 1961).
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be delivered. While some other models still are being currently put in use
(e.g., the Convair 990), the great bulk of jet equipment that has been
ordered is already in service; 1962 and probably also 1963 will find few
deliveries; and the next flurry of jet equipment deliveries will not come
until 1964 (or thereabouts) when the three-engine Boeing 727 comes into
full production. That, however, will still represent less of a burden than
has been sustained during the last three years; American Airlines, for
instance, has 25 Boeing 727's on order, but it already has possession of
48 four-engine jets and expects delivery of 16 Convair 990's within the
next year or so; thus the 727 should pose a relatively smaller problem than
has already been confronted.
The timing of jet plane deliveries and the consequent increase in ca-
pacity can be gauged from Eastern Air Line's projection of available
seat miles:'
1961 ---------------- 9,384 million (actual)
1962 1-------------10,425
1963 --------------- 10,637
19 64 ..............................-10,87 5
1965 12,225
Eastern, which was tardy in acquiring the jets, thus will have a sizeable
increase in capacity this year. But in 1963 and 1964 capacity will increase
very little (for most of the trunk airlines the schedule is similar, with the
significant exception that 1961 represented their large jump in capacity
with 1962 to 1964 to be years of small gains-this reflecting their earlier
entry into the jet race). When the Boeing 727 comes into production and
deliveries begin there will be another sharp rise in passenger capacity.
It deserves emphasis, though, that that is two to three years away and at
the moment the airlines are in a position where traffic can begin to catch
up with available supply.
But will passenger traffic increase sufficiently to permit fully profit-
able use of the existing jet capacity? That, of course, is a major question.
From 1953 to 1957, years of substantial airline profits, traffic grew an-
nually at rates of anywhere from 13% to 19o. As mentioned earlier,
growth in the years following was cyclical, with the traffic increases during
1960 and 1961 being mediocre. As has been suggested there are many
reasons for contending that the past two years were not fairly representa-
tive of future market development, in part because of economic recession
and in part because of steep fare increases. With the upward turn of
the cycle there is excellent reason for believing that traffic will again in-
crease substantially. The Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) estimates that
by the fiscal year 1965 domestic scheduled airline passenger traffic will
amount to 41.5 billion passenger miles (this includes local service as well
as trunk carriers and is up from 30.5 billion miles for fiscal 1961). Dis-
aggregated, the FAA forecast indicates a 1.5 billion mile increase in fiscal
1962 (up about 5o), 3.0 billion in fiscal 1963, and 3.0 in fiscal 1964.5"
This reflects a presumed slower rate of growth than was experienced before
1957 (or in the single year 1959), but is well above that established for
1958, 1960, and 1961. The CAB itself is even more optimistic, predicting
4' Exhibit DL-R 116, p. 2.
0 Federal Aviation Agency, Aviation Forecasts: Fiscal Years 1962-1967, table 1 (October 1961).
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that by 1965 the scheduled airlines will fly about 52.5 billion revenue
passenger miles, with a particularly steep traffic increase in 1962."'
These projections of substantial passenger traffic increases appear to
be borne out by actual 1962 performance. Revenue passenger miles flown
by the domestic trunklines increased by 11.5% in January, 1962, over
the same month a year earlier; in February, up 28.7% (this is somewhat
distorted because of a labor stoppage in February, 1961); in March, up
9.6%; in April, up 11.5%; and in May, up 11.7%." Most of the air-
lines are forecasting substantial increases for the entire year, ranging
from 6% to as high as 15%." Certainly on the basis of results for the
first five months of the year the future looks promising.
Officials of American Airlines, the principal proponent of mergers in
the industry, however, strive to perpetuate the impression that bank-
ruptcy (or a need for subsidy) is just around the corner. One financial
source has taken note of this consciously pessimistic tone and says frankly
that it is explained by their "commitment to the proposed merger.""
Indeed, it is crucial to American and Eastern's position that they con-
vince the appropriate parties that the industry's financial prospects are
dim and that improvement cannot be expected through such forces as
normal traffic increases, fare modifications, etc. If they are able to ac-
complish this feat it will merit an Oscar.
The case for airline mergers, as set forth by American and Eastern, is
also premised on the ground that mergers will curtail unnecessary com-
petition, improvidently brought about by the CAB since 1955, that has
seriously depressed earnings to the economic detriment of the industry
without consequent benefit to the public. Since this is a vital link in their
position it deserves independent consideration, giving due weight to the
structure of the industry and to policies of the CAB as they are reflected
in route awards made since 1955.
II. THE NATURE AND IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASED AIRLINE COMPETITION
In the view of American Airlines, and the other principal proponents
of large-scale trunk line mergers, the basic explanation for the industry's
recent poor financial showing is excessive competition. Pointing to the
large number of awards made since 1955 by the CAB which have in-
creased the degree of competition, American contends that the additional
industry expense annually attributable to this change in circumstance
amounts to about $200 million." If competition could therefore be cur-
tailed, and American claims that the best way of accomplishing this is
5' 1962 ATA Facts and Figures 20.
5*Aviation Week, May 21, 1962, p. 40; Wall Street Journal, May 16, 1962, p. 9, col. 3;
New York Times, June 17, 1962, § 1, p. 83, col. 2. In May the passenger load factor was 51.3%,
compared with 54.6% a year earlier.
13 Actual results tend to confirm these prognostications. During the first quarter this year
American Airlines' revenues increased by 17% over the year before. Over the first four months
of 1962 Braniff's traffic rose by over 12% (in terms of revenue passenger miles flown). During
the first five days of June Eastern flew 15% more passengers to Miami than in the same period
last year.
54 Forbes, May 1, 1962, p. 22.
" Summing up its position American Airlines' witness R. E. Kimble concludes that "the
increasing spread and intensity of competition among the trunklines has been the primary cause
of their decline in profitability. Competition has caused a rise in costs which has exceeded the
increase in fares." Exhibit AE-F, p. 17. The $200 million estimate is found in exhibit AE 166, p. 1.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
via a series of mergers, profits would rise sharply and once more provide
the various surviving carriers with an adequate return on their invest-
ment. So goes the argument.
Bolstering the case for mergers is the position of certain commentators
that competition within a regulated industry, like airlines, is "senseless"
anyway and wthout public advantage. "Airline competition," according
to the travel editor of The New York. Times, "is a kind of Twentieth
Century myth, since where it counts-in price-domestic aviation is a
monopoly with the price fixed by the Civil Aeronautics Board." 6 Ac-
cordingly, goes the argument, why should competition between rival
carriers (certainly between more than two on any given route) be
tolerated; it offers no real benefit and only increases airline costs.
To appraise these positions and to assess meaningfully the conclusion
they are supposed to support, it is necessary to review some basic facts
concerning the character of the airline industry and then consider the
recent policies of the CAB.
A. Character Of The Industry
The domestic airlines, under federal administrative regulation since
1938, fall into four distinct categories-the trunk carriers, now eleven
in number (representing through merger and abandonment a decline
from the 23 originally certified) ; the local service, or feeder, airlines, now
13 in number (also representing a reduction from the 23 which have been
authorized to provide service by the CAB in the years since 1938); the
irregular, or nonscheduled, carriers; and the domestic all-cargo lines."'
This article is concerned almost exclusively with the situation of the trunk
carriers, which continue to provide the great bulk of domestic passenger
service. It might be useful to note however, that the local service airlines
are growing far more rapidly than the trunk lines; from 1955 to 1961,
for instance, the feeder lines increased their revenue passenger miles by
190%, whereas the trunk lines traffic increased by only about 52%. The
feeder carriers are profiting both from a sheer increase in traffic between
the communities they always served and also from new routes which they
have been granted (between 1951 and 1961 their route system has nearly
doubled, now serving 580 cities compared with 384 a decade ago)." The
trunk airlines continue, though, to provide most of the nation's passenger
service.
In 1961, of a total of about 31 billion revenue passenger miles
flown, the eleven trunk carriers accounted for 29.5 billion. In terms
of structure the airline industry is a fine example of oligopoly-that is,
a context in which a few firms supply the relevant service. In 1961 the
'6 New York Times, Feb. 4, 1962, S 10, p. 1, col. 6-8. There are others in the anti-competition
camp: Tipton & Gewirtz, The Effect of Regulated Competition on the Air Transport Industry,
22 J. Air L. & Com. 157 (1955) (this reflecting the ATA attitude, with which the authors were
associated and of which Mr. Tipton is now president); Bluestone, The Problem of Competition
Among Domestic Trunk Airlines, 20 J. Air. L. & Com. 379 (1953), 21 J. Air L. & Com. 50 (1954).
" An excellent portrayal of the domestic airline passenger industry may be found in Report
of the House Judiciary Subcommittee, Airlines 8-33, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). Also see Fulda,
Competition in the Regulated Industries: Transportation (1961); Gray, The Air Transport In-
dustry, in Adams, The Structure of American Industry, ch. XII (rev. ed. 1954).
"6Air Transport Association of America, America's Local Service Airlines (mimeo. May 10,
1962).
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Big Four carriers accounted for about 73% of all the revenue passenger
miles flown by the trunk lines. A complete breakdown is presented below:
TABLE 4. DOMESTIC TRUNK CARRIERS'
REVENUE PASSENGER MILES, 1961
number percent
(millions)














Source: Table 7 infra.
Compared with others, the airline industry is very highly concentrated-
more so, say, than steel, drugs, electrical equipment, or chemicals."'
A more accurate picture of the extent of concentration in the trunk
industry, however, can be gained only by examining the characteristics of
service along particular routes. This leads to several general observations.
First of all, most of the routes connecting most of the 580 cities that
receive scheduled airline service are monopolized; only one carrier pro-
vides the service, if indeed anyone does (obviously not all points receive
service to all other points other than through interchange). Second, on
most competitive routes only two carriers are involved, of which typically
one is dominant. Third, only on a comparatively few, but quantitatively
more important routes, are there three or more competing carriers; even
here rarely are there more than three earnest rivals. Between New York
and Chicago, for example, of the six airlines providing service, three carry
96% of the traffic, with American accounting for 43% and United for
another 37o. Even on the most heavily authorized route in the country-
New York-Washington, where eight lines can offer service-four carriers
account for virtually all of the traffic, with two (American and Eastern)
composing nearly 70% of the total. Below is presented a chart which
indicates the highly concentrated character of a number of selected,
high-density routes.
"'For a presentation of concentration data in a number of manufacturing industries, see
Kaysen and Turner, Antitrust Policy (1959), statistical appendix tables 1, 4. A more compre-
hensive listing, though less refined, is in a Report of the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee, Concen-
tration in American Industry, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1958). Kaysen and Turner, interestingly, term
airlines a highly concentrated industry-"still oligopolistic but significantly less concentrated."
Id. at statistical appendix table 6, p. 290.
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TABLE 5. DIVISION OF TRAFFIC AMONG AIRLINES ON SELECTED
DOMESTIC ROUTES, 3d QUARTER 1961
share of traffic carried by
Route One Carrier Two Three
New York - Boston 48% 73% 91%
Los Angeles - San Francisco 62 92 99
New York - Chicago 43 80 96
New York - Washington 43 70 86
New York - Miami 44 77 99
New York - Los Angeles 43 81 99
New York - Detroit 60 86 88
New York - San Francisco 38 71 99
New York - Cleveland 94 * *
New York - Pittsburgh 49 95 *
Chicago - Los Angeles 33 57 79
Las Vegas - Los Angeles 60 75 83
* Insignificant
Source: CAB. Competition Among Domestic Air Carriers, 3d Quarter 1961.
On either basis, therefore, taking the trunk line industry as a whole or
on specific routes, a very high level of concentration is indicated. And,
with comparatively few exceptions, the dominant carriers are the properly-
named Big Four-United (which became the largest through its recent
merger with Capital), American, TWA, and Eastern (see table 4). The
reason for their prominence (their relative magnitude has not changed
greatly since 1938) is primarily attributable to the fact that they serve
more of the larger traffic-generating cities. In 1960, the FAA classified 23
cities as so-called large traffic hubs; these accounted for 67.5% of all
airline passengers. (Another 35 medium traffic points accounted for an
additional 18.4%)." Of the 23 large traffic locations American Airlines,
for example, serves 16 (including such major points as New York,
Chicago, and Los Angeles) and is authorized to provide service between
most of them. Indeed, of the top 58 traffic-producing communities in the
United States, American Airlines serves 40. This is the key to its position
and to the similar status of the other members of the Big Four: routes
connecting a large number of the major traffic junctures which they have
held since the first days of regulation under "grandfather" certification."
In view of the intense concentration that pervades the trunk airline
industry, and the various specific route segments, is there then any mean-
ingful degree of competition? Put another way, with concentration so
high does it make any sense to strive for maintaining competition? Some
writers would answer in the negative, placing particular stress on the
6 The Project Horizon Report puts the matter a little differently: "Domestic air passenger
traffic presently is concentrated at relatively few of the 580 cities served. In 1960 the 25 leading
traffic centers alone originated and terminated about two-thirds of all the domestic passenger-miles
flown, and about 75 per cent of all the domestic passengers carried. Further, the first 100 cities
accounted for more than 90 per cent of both passenger-miles and passengers." Supra note 15, at 180.
""The nature of the routes of the Big Four carriers, of course, gives them opportunity to
develop large traffic volumes by tapping major pairs of metropolitan centers, particularly those
of long-haul characteristics where air travel has more distinct time advantages over surface
travel." Hearings before the House Antitrust Subcommittee, Monopoly Problems in the Regulated
Industries: Airlines, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), vol. 1, p. 508.
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fact that the industry is regulated (and perhaps also reflecting limited
faith in the virtues of competition). The facts, however, point in just
the opposite direction, suggesting strongly that competition retains sub-
stantial value even in this particular context. Admittedly in concentrated
markets one does not find the kind of uninhibited competition that exists
in, say, the garment industry. Here, where Chamberlin's "monopolistic
competition" ' reigns, the rival sellers are aware that their actions will
affect their compatriots and are thus unlikely to go without response, just
as if General Motors lowers the price on the Chevrolet, Ford can be expected
to follow suit. Thus in considering any "competitive" step any one of
the firms must anticipate not only the market's response but also the
reactions of its rivals. Inevitably this leads to a kind of tacit collusion, or
spontaneous coordination." And the airline industry provides a good
example. By and large fares are uniform (they needn't be, for the CAB
does not set fares, as some writers appear to think, it only responds to
proposals made by the carriers), plane departures for the same destinations
are scheduled at about the same time during the day, flight equipment is
substantially identical, etc.
Nevertheless, as studies of the airline industry over the post-war years
have amply established, competition, even within the limits which exist,
has resulted in a number of innovations that have had distinct public
benefit." This has been particularly true in the case of equipment intro-
duction; being the first in service with a better, faster plane has represent-
ed a competitive advantage eagerly sought-something which is unlikely
to have been true absent the competitive spur. The American-United
equipment rivalry is illustrative.65 In 1946 American Airlines, for example,
was the first to put the Convair model 240 in service (a definite improve-
ment over the DC-3). United soon countered with the initial acquisition
of the Convair 340. But American placed the initial order for the DC-7
and made first use of the Lockheed Electra (which, though ill-fated, per-
mitted flights at average speeds in excess of 400 mph). In 1955 the two
carriers again competed vigorously in jet acquisitions.66 American gambled
by ordering the Boeing 707 while United waited for the Douglas DC-8,
with the result that American had jets in service before United. The
latter, however, was the first to place an order for a medium-range jet,
arranging to purchase the French-made Caravelle.
The advantages of competition are also discernible in the case of coach
class service."' United had first provided coach flights between Los An-
geles and San Francisco in 1940, but shortly abandoned the endeavor for
fear that it would divert passengers from first class. Likewise, American's
president spoke warmly of coach service in 1945. Yet it was neither of
these large airlines that inaugurated coach flights. Instead it was Capital
62 Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (7th ed. 1956). Through Chamberlin's
emphasis is on product differentiation as distinct from structural oligopoly, the qualities are both
involved in the airlines situation.
' See Fellner, Competition Among the Few (1949) for a more complete description of the
processes of oligopolistic interdependence.
'4 Generally, Richmond, Regulations and Competition in Air Transportation, ch. IV (1961);
Gill and Bates, Airline Competition, ch. II (1949) passim.
6" Many of these episodes are examined in Stryker, There's More Than One Way to Run an
Airline, Fortune, October 1961, p. 96.
"6Id. at 152-58.
67 This particular instance of airline competition has been recounted by Cherington, supra
note 41, ch. VI; also see Stryker, supra note 65.
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that did so, in 1948-spurred on, incidentally, by the success which the
irregular operators were having. American did not enter the coach race
until 1949 (but when it did so it used the DC-6 and offered coach flights
at more convenient hours) and United remained on the sidelines until
1950. Once in the business American offered sharp competition, using the
faster DC-7 for coach service in 1956 without any extra charge (United
reluctantly followed suit in 1957).
Other instances of the value of having a number of competitors in the
market can be cited. Capital (a small carrier, it should be noted) was the
first to use turbocraft equipment (in 1955). National was the first to
offer pure-jet service (in 1958). American inaugurated the family-fare
plan. TWA offered the first mixed-class service (in 1955). Allegheny
Airlines, a local-service carrier, provided the first no-reservation service.
National, in 1959, initiated a service at less than coach rates, reflecting
the sharp competition that has characterized the New York-Miami run
since 195 6.' And Eastern, on service between New York and Washington,
began the since-highly successful air-shuttle, a no-reservation, no-waiting,
less than coach fare service.
No one suggests that the foregoing illustrations add up to the un-
restrained kinds of rivalry one might find in a market exhibiting a low
level of concentration. But they are nonetheless of considerable value to
the traveler. Without competition firms inevitably tend to be stodgy,
lethargic, unduly skeptical of innovation; and this seems just as true, if
not more so, where the industry is under government regulation. Eastern
Air Lines, for instance, in the period before it was subjected to competi-
tion on its New York-Houston and St. Louis-Southeast routes, used old,
poor equipment (even high-density coach-type seating configurations for
first-class service) and generally offered a low grade of accommodation;
indeed this was one major reason why the CAB authorized other lines
to begin service over these routes.
But there is also value in having more than two carriers, ceteris paribus.
Where there are only two competitors the probabilities are much greater
that the tone of competition will be markedly less than if three are in-
volved. In the latter case the impact each has on the other when inaugu-
rating a given change in policy normally will be less pronounced, and thus
more likely not to be followed-at least not promptly. Hence there is more
incentive for experiment-with newer equipment, with a change in
schedule, perhaps with a promotional fare arangement (Eastern's use of
the air-shuttle was adopted by Northeast Airlines, but only after several
months had elapsed; and American has declined to follow at all-losing
position in the market as a consequence).
The record strongly evidences the merits of competition in the industry
and along specific routes. A larger number of competitors, even if it be
"National, Eastern, and Northeast have contested vigorously for traffic from the New York-
New England area to Florida, offering significant fare concessions as an inducement. As of this
spring seven different fares were in effect, depending on whether the trip was made at night or
day, first class or coach, prop or jet; the fares ranged from a high of $108.95 (one-way, without
tax) to a low of $58.65. Official Airline Guide (April 1962), pp. C-214/216, C-231, C-169/172.
Of obvious benefit to the traveler, it is fair to conclude that this range of fare choices is the
direct product of competition. On less competitive routes the range of choice is markedly less.
In the face of such evidence it seems absurd to refer to useful rivalry of this type as "silly and
truly noncompetitive," as did a writer reently, Ncw York Times, Nov. 19, 1961, § 10, p. 1,
Col. 1-5.
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only three instead of two, is likely to have distinct, though not always
predictable, public reward. Implicitly the CAB appears to have shared
this attitude in the period since 1955, for during this period it has greatly
accentuated the degree of competition.
B. CAB Policy Since 1955
Let it be said at the outset that any effort to delineate CAB policy is
fraught with danger, simply because the Board is noted for its propensity
to alter its attitude frequently" and for its ability to obscure the grounds
for its action. In the Board's behalf let it be admitted, however, that the
pertinent statutory language is itself ambiguous. The Board is admonished
by the Aviation Act to "consider the following, among other things, as
being in the public interest, and in accordance with the public convenience
and necessity. . . . (d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the
sound development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to
the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce to the United States ... "
This legislative declaration provides no clear guidance, in fact it is to a
degree contradictory, and thus we should probably not be surprised at the
Board's ambivalent interpretations.0 From 1938 to about 1944, for ex-
ample, it invoked "a strong, although not conclusive, presumption in
favor of competition on any route which offered sufficient traffic to sup-
port competing services without unreasonable increase of total operating
cost."" Never did it articulate what amounted to "sufficient traffic" or
what was an "unreasonable increase of total operating cost"; but still it
seemed favorably disposed to more competition as a factor which assists
in the fullest development of the national air transportation system.
Beginning about 1944, however, the Board abandoned the presumption
doctrine. If existing service were deemed adequate new awards were rarely
made, the Board majority (the dissenters usually referred to the decisions
as reflecting an "anticompetitive philosophy") cynically disowning com-
petition under such circumstances as amounting to no more than "com-
petition for competition's sake""2 (reminiscent of language from the early
depression years of the 1930's).
In 1955, under the guidance of its new chairman, Ross Rizley, the
Board once more swung back to a policy of favoring competition wherever
there was sufficient traffic."3 Not only did it feel that competition was
conducive to the vigorous development of air transportation, but it felt
it might offer other advantages-such as eliminating airline subsidy by
permitting weaker carriers to tap richer markets.
Commencing in 1955 the Board went about the job of increasing trunk
airline competition with unrelenting zeal. In a series of decisions, begin-
69 "The Civil Aeronautics Board in the course of its very short history has shown an almost
incredible flexibility in moving toward and away from competition." Jaffe, Book Review, 65
Yale L.J. 1068, 1074 (1956).
7072 Stat. 740 (1958), 49 U.S.C. S 1302 (1959).
" Transcontinental and Western Air, Inc. et al., Additional North-South California Services,
4 C.A.B. 373, 375 (1943). The most comprehensive review of the Board's actions in this earlier
period is Westwood,. Choice of the Air Carrier for New Air Transport Routes, 16 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 1 (1947), 16 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 159 (1948).
72 E.g., Northwest Air, et al., Chicago-Milwaukee-New York Service, 6 C.A.B. 217, 228 (1944).
71 For general treatments of the post-1955 period, see Richmond, supra note 64; Gellman, The
Regulation of Competition in the United States Domestic Air Transportation: A Judicial Survey and
Analysis, 24 J. Air L. & Com. 410 (1957), 25 J. Air L. & Com. 148 (1958); Richmond,
Creating Competition Among Airlines, 24 J. Air L. & Cor. 435 (1957).
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ning with the New York-Chicago Service case in 19557' and most recently
in the Pacific-Southwest Local Service case,"' the CAB opened up a number
of markets to other carriers, as indicated below:
SELECTED MARKETS WITH INCREASED COMPETITION, 1955-1961
Increased from one to two or more carriers
New York - Dallas New York - Houston
Dallas - Los Angeles Dallas - San Francisco
Chicago - Denver St. Louis - Miami
Increased from two to three or more carriers
Los Angeles - San Francisco New York - Miami
New York - Atlanta New York - New Orleans
Chicago - Miami
Increased from three to four or more carriers
New York - Detroit New York - Chicago
New York - Washington Boston - Washington
Between 1955 and 1957 the Board provided new or improved competitive
service to at least 514 city pairs.7" Dozens of routes which formerly had
been the monopoly domains of grandfather carriers, particularly of the
Big Four, were opened up to hunting by new entrants. The result was that
where in 1955 more than 44% of revenue passenger miles were carried on
routes effectively monopolized (i.e., where one carrier handled 90% or
more of the traffic), by 1960 this had declined to 27.8%."
Unquestionably the Board has taken immense strides during the last
seven years in increasing competition in the domestic trunk airline in-
dustry. What is less clear, however, is the precise rationale for its actions.
Of course, it favored competition as a general rule; yet it also recognized
that not all markets were suitable candidates because of indaequate traffic.
But why it made the specific determinations in individual cases is not
always clear. Indeed, as other critics have frequently pointed out (Louis
Hector for one,"' and more recently Judge Henry Friendly7"), the Board's
opinions simply do not opine. Rather they recite any of a number of ob-
jectives that are deemed desirable, announce that the instant decision
promises their fulfillment, and add the old caveat that the facts of each
case govern. The result is to leave the reader with very little guidance for
the future and with only a vague understanding of what explains the
Board's conclusion.
Running through all of the major cases from 1955 to 1961 (and per-
haps to date, although this is increasingly hard to determine), though, is
the theme that "competitive service holds the greatest prospect for vigorous
74 22 C.A.B. 973 (1955).
75 IA Av. L. Rep. 21,248 (1962).
" Richmond, supra note 64, at 130 passim.
77 Exhibits AE 153-54.
78 Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commission, 69 Yale L.J.
931 (1960). One of the reasons no doubt lies in the use of professional opinion writers. "Members
of these opinion writing staffs explain that they consciously avoid statements of general principle
as much as possible in the opinions they write, because they must be able to write an opinion
justifying an opposite conclusion the next day, and hence must not be hampered by prior
statements of general principles." Id. at 942-43.
7' Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards,
75 Harv. L. Rev. 1055, 1072-97 (1962). Judge Friendly was formerly counsel to Pan American
World Airways.
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development of our national air transport system." This attitude appears
to underly the various decisions, for once the Board takes this stance and
repudiates the idea, as it did in the Southwest-Northeast Service Case,s°
that the existing service must be found inadequate before there can be any
increase in route competition, conditions are manifestly conducive to ad-
ditional service awards. This is not to say that the only goal which the
Board has wished to achieve is an increase in competition. Indeed in every
major case of the last seven years there were a number of factors involved
in the decision. In some cases existing service was simply not adequate. On
its New York-Houston"' and St. Louis-Miami operations, s" for instance,
Eastern Air Lines, the only authorized carrier, had been using second-rate
equipment and generally offering a low-grade service; competition, the
Board felt, would provide a remedy, leading to more service and stimu-
lating the established carrier as well.
But in the final analysis the CAB has been governed by the feeling
that competition is desirable per se and offers a way to achieve greater
balance in the industry without working significant economic hardship on
the bigger carriers. In the New York-Florida Case,5 for instance, the
Board authorized Northeast Airlines to provide a third-carrier service
between points in the northeast and Florida. One of the principal reasons
for doing so, and in preferring Northeast over other applicants (Delta
most notably), was to give Northeast access to a high-density, long-haul
market in the expectation that this would make continued subsidy un-
necessary. In the Southwest-Northeast Service Case the Board, in award-
ing Braniff the New York-Dallas route, explained:
Unless the relative economic opportunity - and basically this means
route systems - of the smaller carriers approaches more closely that of the
Big Four, their competitive position and ability to weather economic ad-
versity are bound to suffer. . . It is of considerable significance that the
dominance of the Big Four flows from their access to the high-density mar-
kets, and this enables them to attain greater economy in operating costs and
flexibility in scheduling of service."
This policy also largely explains route awards to Capital and Northwest
in the New York-Chicago Service Case" and to National in last year's
Southern Transcontinental decision."
In making the various competitive awards the Board has been obligated,
of course, to consider the scale of the respective market in assessing
whether the existing carrier(s) can withstand competition. In the New
York-Chicago case, as an illustration, American Airlines argued that the
so Southwest-Northeast Service Case, 22 C.A.B. 52 (1955).
'Id. at 65.
"s "There is considerable evidence in the record to show that the service provided by Eastern
is not comparable with that offered in competitive markets .... For example, the record shows
that Eastern continued to use five-abreast seating in first-class flights until late 1956, long after
it had introduced more convenient configuration in competitive markets; and the carrier utilized
only slow unpressurized DC-4 aircraft for St. Louis-Miami nonstop service until the winter of
1956. In addition Eastern failed to provide nonstop service with modern equipment between
St. Louis and Atlanta until 1956. At most, Eastern provided only limited frequencies in the
St. Louis-Southeast markets, with resulting space shortages and unduly high load factors."
St. Louis-Southeast Service Case, 27 C.A.B. 342, 346 (1958).
"24 C.A.B. 94 (1956).
8422 C.A.B. 52, 57-58 (1955).
8 22 C.A.B. 973 (1955).
"e 1A Av. L. Rep. 5 21,131 (1961).
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New York-Detroit route could not support more than a single carrier.
To this contention, a kind that can be found in each major decision, the
Board replied, in rather typically evasive fashion:
In our judgment, the size and potential of the New York-Detroit market
will now support three turnaround services rather than merely one hereto-
fore operated by American. Thus the record shows that in this area the New
York-Detroit market is exceeded only by the New York-Chicago market,
and yet American is the only unrestricted operator between New York and
Detroit. The much smaller New York-Cleveland market has two turnaround
services. Furthermore, the New York-Detroit market increased by 86 percent
from 1949 to 1954. Under such circumstances, we have no hesitation in find-
ing that the New York-Detroit market will support two additional services. "7
This is really no more than a bootstraps argument, for one can search
without avail for an explanation of why the New York-Cleveland market
can support two services. Moreover, even if the Cleveland route can
sustain two rivals, what rationalizes three in the Detroit market (why
not just two, or perhaps four) ? The other decisions are likewise unhelp-
ful. Thus, a third service was authorized between New York and Miami
with the bare explanation that "there can be little question that the
markets here involved are in material aspects more than comparable to
those for which in recent cases we have authorized service by more than
two carriers";" between the Great Lakes and the South ("We are con-
vinced that the traffic is sufficiently large now and has the inherent po-
tential to support another carrier in addition to Delta and Eastern. The
Chicago-Miami market is by far the largest two-carrier market in the
country and has shown an impressive continuing growth ... .") ;"8 and
just this year between Los Angeles and San Francisco (this "is one of the
largest air traffic markets in the country . . . the tremendous traffic gen-
erating ability of the market accounted for more than a million local
passengers in 1958, even outproducing the important New York-Miami
market")."° Similar language, equally unsatisfying, can be found in other
opinions supporting awards which meant a competing (or second) car-
rier, as in the St. Louis-Southeast Service Case" and in the Southwest-
Northeast" decision.
While it is not always easy to detect the logic in the Board's decisions,
the fact clearly is that from 1955 to 1960 the extent of airline competi-
tion in the United States was greatly expanded. As mentioned earlier, the
monopolized routes declined from 44% to 27.8% during those five
years. Moreover, the amount of traffic carried on routes where only two
airlines competed also declined as a result of additional awards; from
1955 to 1960 the proportion of revenue passenger miles carried on routes
where there were three or more effective competitors rose from 15.8% to
32.4%. But this does not reveal the extent to which the various trunk
airlines individually were affected. Table 6 presents this information.
8722 C.A.B. 973, 991 (1955).
8824 C.A.B. 94, 98-99 (1956).
"Great Lakes-Southeast Service Case, 27 C.A.B. 829, 846 (1958).
85Pacific-Southwest Local Service Case, 1A Av. L. Rep. 5 21,248 (1962), at pp. 14,715-16.
"'St. Louis-Southeast Service Case, 27 C.A.B. 342 (1958).
922 C.A.B. 52 (1955).
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TABLE 6. AMOUNT OF TRAFFIC CARRIED BY DOMESTIC TRUNK
AIRLINES UNDER MONOPOLY AND COMPETITIVE CONDITIONS
(percentage of revenue passenger miles carried)
Traffic on Routes with
Carrier Monopoly Traffic Two or More Other
Carriers
1955 1960 1955 1960
American 41.4% 22.8% 30.7% 39.1%
Braniff 67.6 49.8 0.3 5.1
Capital 50.8 29.5 9.9 26.4
Continental 87.5 34.8 0.1 27.4
Delta 62.1 41.1 0.8 18.6
Eastern 53.7 26.3 1.6 31.4
National 19.8 22.0 1.0 55.4
Northeast 91.3 20.1 8.4 66.8
Northwest 40.7 26.1 0.2 13.2
TWA 37.1 21.2 25.2 42.9
United 38.7 29.0 19.3 29.5
Western 45.6 46.6 7.9 9.9
Weighted average 44.4 27.8 15.8 32.8
Source: Exhibits AE 153-14.
As is evident, by 1960 all but two of the airlines carried less traffic under
monopoly conditions than in 1955. But the smaller carriers received most
of the new route awards, thus tending to offset the greater degree of
competition they were being subjected to in their older markets. In terms
of new service authorization equivalent to or better than that of the
least restricted other carriers, Professor Richmond found that 88% of
the new passenger exposure and 83% of the passenger mile exposure
went to the smaller eight (now seven) airlines. American and Eastern
received access to less than 1% of the potential new passenger miles.
United gained access to about 4%, and, surprisingly, TWA about 13%
(this Was as good as for any other carrier except Northeast)."' On paper,
therefore, the smaller carriers received the bulk of the new route awards,
after making adjustment for operating restrictions and other such factors.
But what are the lessons of history? How have the various carriers been
affected?
C. General Consequences
In spite of the CAB's strong efforts to achieve greater balance within
the industry by granting the smaller airlines access to richer routes, the
Big Four still retain a commanding position within the industry. In 1955,
the last year before the Board's new policy took hold, the four leading
airlines carried about 74.5% of all revenue passenger miles. By 1960, as
Table 7 shows, this share had declined, but only slightly, to 71.5%; in
1960 it rose to 73.0% (largely because of the United-Capital merger).
The share of revenue mileage held by the smaller carriers increased in
every case except for the Northwest and National (whose position will
definitely improve due to its 1961 Southern Transcontinental award."'
0 Richmond, supra note 64, ch. IX and especially tables IX-5/IX-14,
USupra note 86.
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Northeast (because of its 1956 New York-Florida award), Continental
(with recent extensions from Chicago to Denver and Denver to Los
Angeles), and Delta (benefitting from service authorizations between
New York and Houston, New Orleans, and Atlanta) registered par-
ticularly healthy traffic increases.
In the final analysis, however, what counts is profits. As the foregoing
discussion and the details presented in Table 7 demonstrate, the smaller
carriers generally gained some traffic at the expense of the larger airlines,
particularly American and Eastern. But the recently-authorized awards
have not bolstered profitability for the weaker carriers in spite of their
heavier passenger traffic. Northeast is not a good test (it was in serious
difficulty when it was granted entry to the New York-Miami market),'s
but even Delta and Continental, which, relatively, benefitted more than
the other lines, still found their profit margins slipping between 1955 and
1961. The same is true for all of the others. One is properly entitled to
ask: what happened?
For one important thing passenger traffic has not increased as rapidly
since 1957 (precisely when the CAB began to make its numerous new
competitive route awards) as in the immediately preceding years. Take
the New York-Washington route as an illustration. In 1956 this route was
dominated by American and Eastern, the former carrying some 63 % of
the passengers who moved between those two points. Northeast Airlines
was thereupon authorized to serve the route, the Board insisting that what-
ever diversion would result will "come out of future traffic growth in
the markets involved."'" But by 1961, as Table 8 shows, traffic between
the two points had increased by only about 10% (or about half that of
the domestic trunk industry as a whole). Of this somewhat larger market
American now carried 26% of the total, Eastern 42%, and Northeast
about 20% (the remainder divided among National and other carriers).
Thus, while the market had expanded, it had not done so sufficiently to
offset the dilution that Northeast's entry had brought about. The same
is true of the most important of the other routes over which increased
competition had been sanctioned. Indeed, just as the Board began to step
up the degree of competition, relying on the markets' rapid past growth,
traffic dried up, as Table 8 well demonstrates. The New York-Miami
route, where traffic had increased by 51% from 1954 to 1957, grew by
only 3.6% from 1957 to 1960. The New York-Houston and New York-
New Orleans markets actually shrunk. Hence the various pies which the
Board decided to carve into a larger number of pieces, on the theory that
the pies would get bigger and continue to be divisible equitably, simply
stopped growing-with rare exception. What is responsible for this sharp
decline in the rate of passenger traffic growth is not easily determined. No
doubt the two recessions, 1957-1958 and 1960-1961, bear some of the
blame. A miscellany of other explanations could be added. But, as the
discussion earlier suggested, the rapid post-1958 fare increases cannot be
overlooked. While airline fares had not increased at all between 1954 and
1957, from 1957 to 1960 fares went up by about 21% (if the jet differ-
95 Indeed at the time the award was made two members of the Board dissented, with Mem-
ber Denny firmly convinced that Northeast was simply not able to make effective use of the
Florida routes. For one thing it lacked equipment comparable in size and speed to that already
in use by Eastern and National. 24 C.A.B. 94, 124 (1956).9824 C.A.B. 94, 105 (1956).
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ential is taken into account). It is reasonable to expect that this would
have a particularly noticeable impact on routes heavily patronized by
tourists, such as New York-Miami or New York-New Orleans. Obviously
other forces have been at work; but it is foolish to think that fares can
be raised without retarding traffic growth.
TABLE 8. AIRLINE TRAFFIC GROWTH, SELECTED MARKETS, 1954-1960
Year
Market* (millions of revenue Percentage Increase
passenger miles flown)
1954 1957 1960 1954-1957 1957-1960
Total, All Trunk Traffic 16.20t 24.4t 29.2t 51% 21%
New York - Detroit 111 163 182 47 12
New York - Chicago 393 514 596 31 16
New York - Miami 651 984 1,019 51 4
New York - Dallas 80 127 168 59 32
New York - Washington 101 135 149 34 10
New York - Boston 101 139 167 38 20
New York - Houston 87 129 124 48 -4
New York - New Orleans 67 110 97 64 -12
New York - Atlanta 64 84 95 31 13
Chicago - Denver 31 47 66 52 40
Chicago - Detroit 52 63 64 21 2
Denver - Los Angeles 35 65 100 86 54
Chicago - Los Angeles 255 349 478 37 37
New York - San Francisco 444 663 780 49 18
New York - Cleveland 77 111 118 44 6
* Markets selected are ones in which degree of competition has been covered by CAB action,
1955-1962.
tIn billions
Source: CAB. Competition Among Domestic Air Carriers; Richmond, supra, note 64, appendix 3;
1962 ATA Facts and Figures, p. 17
Since it possesses the power to suspend fare proposals made by the
airlines the CAB may, therefore, actually have been working at cross-
purposes over the past seven years-accepting substantial fare hikes that
were likely to slacken the very traffic growth that was essential to the
successful implementation of its policy of increasing competition. There
are some indications that the Board may recognize this possible incon-
sistency. Recently it has spoken clearly of the need for greater promotional
efforts on the part of the airlines. In 1960 it approved a low-cost "air-bus"
service between Pittsburgh and Miami, saying that this was consistent
with its policy of "encouraging the filing of fares designed to promote air
travel, particularly the low fare type of service designed to enable air
transportation to penetrate more effectively into a larger market.""'
Nevertheless the Board insists that all air fares cover fully all allocated
costs. (It reflected this attitude a few months ago in the Pittsburgh-
Philadelphia No-Reservation Fare Investigation.)" This means that the
airlines have too little room in which to experiment with fare reductions,
" Eastern Air Lines, Inc.-In the Matter of Local "Air-Bus" Passenger Fares, IA Av. L. Rep.
21,067 (1960).
9' 1A Av. L. Rep. 5 21,230 (1961).
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strongly reinforcing their customary propensity to price in a highly con-
servative fashion. One is definitely reminded of the practice of the
electric utilities to wait for consumption to increase before reducing
prices; the airlines, too, believe that the demand for their services is
inelastic until they see conclusive evidence to the contrary-in response
either to fare increases or reductions. At the moment the trend to higher
fares is clearly evident, with the airlines proposing and the CAB usually
approving (with occasional minor modifications). This is well calculated
to inhibit traffic growth and accentuate the problems created by the
various competitive awards which have been made in recent years.
To American Airlines and the other advocates of trunkline mergers,
however, the recent decline in carrier profits is explained basically by just
one thing: increased competition stemming from the CAB post-1955
route awards. They find a distinct correlation between the decline in the
amount of traffic carried under monopoly conditions and the shrinkage
in airline profits.9 In their opinion the immediate answer lies in a lessening
of competition, and this they insist can best be accomplished through con-
solidation. There are, however, several flaws in this line of argument. First,
if Northeast Airlines, which has been in serious difficulty since long before
the CAB embarked on its program of stepping up competition in 1955,
is excluded from the analysis, along with National, any meaningful
mathematical correlation between profitability and the amount of mono-
poly traffic collapses.' Second, the recent decline in airline profits is at
least as well explained by a reduction in the rate of growth of passenger
traffic and by other factors, ranging from recession to the costs of jet
acquisitions and their introduction, as by the Board's policy of increasing
competition since 1955. The latter, of course, has contributed to airline
problems, but it is not their cause. Third, explicit in the American-Eastern
argument is the idea that increased competition accelerates costs and that,
if curtailed, expenses could be reduced sufficiently to yield reasonable re-
turns. For the trunk airlines as a group the cost per available ton mile
went up from 260 to 290 between 1955 and 1960, and per revenue ton
mile from 46.1 to 57.20. American insists that these increased expenses
are attributable predominantly to increased competition and that if com-
petition could be cut back to its 1955 level aggregate airline costs would
fall by $200 million. But there are at least two difficulties with this pre-
sentation. For one, while costs have increased since 1955, so too have
revenues; thus revenue per revenue ton mile has increased over this period
from 51.60 to 58.30, more, relatively, than the cost per available ton mile."'
The fact that the cost per revenue ton mile went up more than revenue
per revenue ton mile suggests that the amount of service offered was
unwisely expanded; it is difficult to link this with competition per se.
Moreover, as a general matter the proof offered by American Airlines fails
to establish that rising costs are attributable solely or even largely to
more intensive competition. Rather they seem more easily traceable to the
expenses incurred for jet purchases and introduction, to special conditions
"The American Airlines evidence is contained in a number of statistical exhibits. See exhibits
AE-151/155, as explained in AE-F.
'"OExhibit NAL-500/501. National and Northeast are the boundary specimens; in 1955 the
former was the most profitable carrier although it had the least amount of monopoly traffic, and
Northeast was the least profitable although it had the greatest amount of monopoly traffic.
1"'Exhibit AE-F, p. 4. For a rebuttal see NAL-$00/501.
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(equipment modifications, for example), and to a sharp drop in the
growth of passenger traffic. Relevant to the latter is the information that
Continental Airlines reported a drop in its costs per revenue ton mile from
1955 to 1960 as the apparent result of an increase in its passenger traffic.
Suffice it to say that under these circumstances to blame competition for
the recent decline in industry profits is totally unwarranted. Fourth, to
the extent that a curtailment in existing levels of competition might be
in order (as where independent study by the CAB might determine com-
petition to be improvident beneath a certain traffic level), there is still
grave doubt that airline consolidation represents the best means of ac-
complishing this objective.
The question of mergers, though, deserves further analysis, for it is
the contention of American Airlines that merger, specifically with Eastern
Air Lines, not only represents a solution to airline financial problems (an
unconvincing argument, as indicated above), but will provide substantial
public benefit without significant detriment. If this is true, then airline
mergers may be desirable, whether they are proximately related to the
industry's economic difficulties or not. Accordingly the American-Eastern
merger, as a prime case in point, deserves close inspection-within a
broader framework of the CAB policy as to mergers and their competitive
implications.
III. MONOPOLY, COMPETITION AND THE AMERICAN-EASTERN MERGER
American Airline's application for approval of its merger with Eastern
Air Lines, a consolidation viewed by the petitioners as the solution to their
problems and as a guide for the remainder of the industry, is now pending
before the CAB. At this writing the hearing has just been finished, one
that summoned forth the active intervention of most of the other trunk
airlines (with Delta being particularly active in opposition) as well as
diverse other organizations, not to overlook the Department of Justice."'
It is American Airlines, however, which has the obligation in effect of
going forward and establishing that the merger "will not be inconsistent
with the public interest" and will not result "in creating a monopoly
or monopolies."
In its behalf American argues principally that the merger will curtail
some of the competition that has been generated of late by improvident
CAB awards. (Admittedly this amounts to a slap in the face, but it is
what the argument amounts to, devoid of diplomatic language.) More-
over, it is contended, the affiliation with Eastern provides an opportunity
for achieving greater operating efficiency and permits new, through serv-
ice connecting a number of the country's cities. American and Eastern
now serve thirty common locations; in itself this means they can combine
ticket offices, airport terminal facilities, hangars, etc. As well, since
American's peak travel season occurs in the summer while Eastern's is in
the winter, their capital requirements can be significantly reduced and
more intensive use made of existing flight equipment. Thus the merger
promises greater efficiency, lower costs, and improved service. As sort of
a bonus, all of these qualities can be accomplished without adverse com-
petitive effect. If so, it is indeed a rare and attractive undertaking. But
" Nor the CAB's own Bureau of Economic Regulation, which has opposed the merger.
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there is reason to doubt the validity of these representations, particularly
as to the merger's competitive consequences. To put this aspect of the
case in its proper setting, however, first requires a perusal of the relevant
legislation and of the Board's past merger decisions.
A. Mergers And The CAB: A Search For Standards
All mergers between airlines must be authorized by the CAB before
they can be lawfully consummated °--but section 408 (b) of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 (in this respect identical to the comparable pro-
vision in the original 1938 federal legislation) requires approval unless
the Board finds that the proposed arrangement "will not be consistent with
the public interest."'"" This provision represents one of the principal ways
in which the issue of competition-versus-monopoly is presented, for in
defining "public interest" the Board invariably turns to section 102 of
the Act which declares, as being in the public interest, "competition to the
extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air-transportation
system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic com-
merce of the United States .. ,"1" Although this statutory declaration
is lacking in any desirable degree of precision, nevertheless in its past con-
sideration of merger applications the Board has leaned heavily on its lan-
guage in finding that a given proposal was not consistent with the public
interest. This was true in two of the leading merger cases, one involving
United's proposed acquisition of Western Air Lines,"' and the other
American's planned purchase of Mid-Continent Air Lines."' In both
decisions the Board seemed primarily disturbed over the possibility that
the contemplated mergers, in each instance involving one of the Big Four
and a markedly smaller truck carrier, would accentuate the overall degree
of industrial concentration, contribute to greater imbalance and injure
the weaker airlines. In the former United, operating from New York to
San Francisco, and also authorized to fly between Seattle and San Diego,
proposed to acquire Western, a major north-south system in the Pacific
coast region. The two lines intersected at Salt Lake City. As the Board
viewed the facts the merger would give United direct access to the entire
west coast area for the origination of transcontinental traffic. This, it felt,
was undesirable. "To allow one air carrier to obtain control of air trans-
portation in the West Coast area greatly in excess of that possessed by
competitors would ...seriously endanger the development of a properly
10372 Stat. 767 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1378(a) (1959). Once the Board approves a merger
the parties affected are "relieved from the operations of the 'antitrust laws'." 72 Stat. 770 (1958),
49 U.S.C. § 414 (1959).
10449 U.S.C. § 1378(a) (1959).
' 72 Stat. 740 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1959). In considering a similar legislative declara-
tion pertaining to mergers coming under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
the Supreme Court has ruled that the "public interest" criterion requires the ICC to "consider
the effect of the merger on competitors and on the general competitive situation in the industry
in the light of the objectives of the national transportation policy." The Court rejected the
argument that the agency might disregard the antitrust policy since the statute did not expressly
require its application. "Congress . . . neither has made the anti-trust laws wholly inapplicable
to the transportation industry nor has authorized the Commission in passing on a proposed
merger to ignore their policy." McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 86-87 (1944).
"" United Air Lines Transport Corporation-Acquisition of Western Air Express Corporation,
1 C.A.A. 739 (1940).
" American Airlines, Inc., Acquisition of Control of Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc., 7 C.A.B.
365 (1946).
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balanced air-transportation system in this region."'0 A similar philosophy
was apparent in the disapproval of American's purchase of Mid-Continent,
the latter operating north-south, bisecting the nation in a relatively nar-
row path running from Minneapolis-St. Paul through Kansas City and
Tulsa to New Orleans and Houston, with two legs extending into St.
Louis. The Board, noting also that the two systems were relatively un-
complementary, was largely influenced by the possibility that American
would have an undue competitive advantage in obtaining business,
originating to and destined from points on the Mid-Continent routes.
"[T]he wider the geographical scope of a carrier's operations in com-
parison with a particular rival, the greater the competitive advantage
which it will enjoy through the control of traffic originating at or destined
to points to which the other carrier does not have access.''. (The close
relevance of this statement to the American-Eastern merger can be noted
later.)
The statute, while on the one hand requiring the approval of airline
mergers unless found inconsistent with the public interest, also provides
that "the Board shall not approve any consolidation . . . which would
result in creating a monopoly or monopolies and thereby restrain com-
petition or jeopardize another air carrier not a party to the consolida-
tion. . . ,,... Strangely, this part of the statute has received little clarify-
ing interpretation. The Board, in disapproving a merger because of its
competitive implications, has chosen over the years to rest its decisions,
not on the monopoly proviso, but rather on the looser formulation of
inconsistency with the public interest. Indeed, so far the CAB has not
faced squarely the problem of implementing the monopoly proviso at
all. Now the American-Eastern merger presents this precise issue and the
Board can responsibly avoid the problem no longer.
The closest the CAB has come to defining the term "monopoly," as used
in the Act, was in the 1940 United-Western Interchange ruling. There
it determined, first of all, that "restraint of competition" is a factor
"only if it results from that degree of control which [it] decides con-
stitutes a monopoly of air transportation.''. Thus, if there is no monopoly,
there can be no restraint of competition, or at least so the Board interprets
the Federal Aviation Act. Thus the ultimate test is whether the merger
will result in creating a "monopoly." How then is that term to be de-
fined? The Board, through a rather remarkable use of near meaningless
words, has so far avoided any intelligent response.
In United-Western, the first and what in many respects remains the
clearest case on the point, the Board said that "the word 'monopoly' . . .
refers to a particular degree of control of air transportation, or any
phase thereof, in any territory or section of the country." The "particular
degree of control," of which the Board speaks, is said to refer to "the
control of a particular business or article of trade, without regard to the
results which may flow therefrom."'' This is hardly satisfying. And in
attempting to apply this definition the Board has only made the matter
more obscure. For example, in approving a merger between Braniff and
1° Supra note 106, at 750.
log Supra note 107, at 378.
"049 U.S.C. § 1378(b) (1959).
.. I C.A.A. 723, 733-34 (1940).
112 Ibid.
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Mid-Continent the Board noted that these two carriers had provided the
only direct service between Kansas City and Houston. Certainly this
would seem to create a monopoly of service between the two points, what
could readily be termed a section of the country. But the hearing examiner
(affirmed by the Board) concluded otherwise, saying that
this removal of competition for passengers traveling between . . . [these two
points] will not affect the amount of service now available, but on the con-
trary it appears that additional services will result. . . .Accordingly, it ap-
pears that the substitution of the merged company for the two separate
companies, insofar as the provision of service between Kansas City and
Houston is concerned, will not result in creating a monopoly which will
restrain competition or jeopardize air carriers not a party to the merger."'
What this seems to mean is that while a monopoly admittedly was created,
it was not such as to restrain competition. If this is an accurate reading,
it makes no sense: the essence of monopoly is restraint of competition, for
if the latter were not achieved indeed there could be no monopoly. It may,
on the other hand, amount to a conclusion that no monopoly was created,
even though the merger involved the only two airlines providing the
only service between given locations. This likewise makes little sense.
Perhaps what the Board has in mind, without clearly saying so, is the
notion that if a merger holds out the promise of better service (or more
efficient operations, or what have you), the fact that it eliminates a
competitor is unimportant."" This, if true, is implausible for if airlines A
and B, which provide the only service between two given locations or
which provide the bulk of the service (say, % or more), merge, it is
difficult to argue that no monopoly has been established. 1' And the statute,
whether one agrees or not, enjoins the Board from approving any merger
the effect of which is to create a "monopoly or monopolies"; the fact that
better service might result is completely beside the point. In this respect
Congress clearly favored competition to monopoly, come what may.
Even though the CAB's handling of the competition-monopoly prob-
lem leaves a good deal to be desired, the standards which it has set forth,
as outlined above, provide a general framework within which to appraise
the merits of the American-Eastern merger. It will be useful to recall,
"'Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 708, 735 (1952).
14See Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, 2 C.A.B. 1 (1940). In upholding the Board's
approval of last year's United-Capital merger the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
in a rather casual discussion of the issues, took something of the same attitude. It concluded
that the consolidation would not create a monopoly, looking at the "whole picture" (whatever
that means). Admitting that on four specific routes a monopoly would result the Court never-
theless said the merger would create competition, substituting a stronger carrier for a weaker.
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 2 Av. L. Rep. 17,809 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
115 At an early date the CAA seemed to recognize the necessity of defining the relevant market
in assessing the likelihood that a monopoly would be created. United Air Lines Transport
Corporation and Western Air Express Corporation-Interchange of Equipment, I C.A.A. 723
(1940). There the agency said that the term "monopoly" refers to "a particular degree of control
of air transportation, or any phase thereof, in any territory or section of the country," citing
authority which directly involved the matter of market definition. Id. at 733-34. And within
the context of air transportation it is perfectly reasonable to argue that the "market" consists
of the direct routing between certain cities. Hence, where a merger will join, say, the only two
carriers operating on a given route, monopoly is the result and the statute forbids the approval
of mergers in such cases. Furthermore, less than total control of a given market can also amount
to monopoly, as the courts have pointed out in their interpretation of section 2 of the Sherman
Act. At least with two-thirds of the market-probably much less-a firm can exercise a high
degree of control over price and other relevant variables, and this control is the ultimate criterion
of monopoly. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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too, that since 1955 the Board has been intent on creating additional
competition on the routes served by the trunkline industry. Really, there-
fore, two kinds of policy considerations are in issue: (1) the declaration
of the Aviation Act permitting approval of mergers only if not incon-
sistent with the public interest and unless productive of monopoly; (2)
the Board's post-1955 policy of increasing route competition as a means
of achieving greater balance within the industry and insuring maximum
development of the domestic air transport system.
B. The American-Eastern Merger
The merger of Eastern Air Lines into American Airlines, agreed to by
their respective boards of directors on January 23, 1962, would create a
massive corporate entity, with assets of $950 million-greater than those
of RCA or General Dynamics, or of such large railroads as the Chesapeake
& Ohio and the Baltimore & Ohio. Within the airline industry itself a
combined American-Eastern would become the largest carrier, regardless
of the standard of comparison. In 1961 American accounted for 20%
of all revenue passenger miles flown by the trunk airlines in domestic
operations, Eastern for 13.51%. Together, therefore, they would represent
a third of the total passenger traffic. In conjunction with last year's
United-Capital merger (which made United the nation's biggest one
airline), amalgamation of American and Eastern means that the two
biggest airlines together would dominate about 60% of trunk airline
traffic and that the three largest (including TWA) would account for
about 75 %. The result clearly would be a sizeable increase in the level
of concentration, far more than offsetting in one step all of the Board's
efforts over the last several years to achieve less concentration and greater
industrial balance. Moreover, the likely effect of the proposed merger
would be to trigger off a series of other consolidations, as the surviving
carriers struggled (rationally or otherwise) to maintain relative position
within the industry. Certainly if the Board swallows this proposed merger
it will have immense difficulty in rejecting a number of other consolida-
tions, most of which would involve aggregations of capital and passenger
traffic of far less magnitude. Interestingly, it is precisely these kinds of
considerations that led Judge Weinfeld to forbid a merger of Bethlehem
Steel and Youngstown Sheet and Tube in 1958.11 There the parties
together possessed about 21% of total steel ingot capacity; merger
promised to entrench Bethlehem in number two place in the industry and
also to lead to further concentration, giving the top two firms nearly 50%
of ingot capacity; as well, if this merger were tolerated, he reasoned, it
would be likely to inspire other mergers to which it would be difficult to
object. While the Bethlehem-Youngstown case was brought under section
7 of the Clayton Act, the kinds of competitive repercussions it was
thought to present are directly relevant in evaluating the American-
Eastern proposal." '
... United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). And
precisely these kinds of factors were also involved in the recent Brown Shoe decision, where the
Supreme Court upheld a section 7 violation. Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
.. Moreover, the CAB is charged with the responsibility of enforcing section 7 of the
Clayton Act in respect to mergers within its jurisdiction. 15 U.S.C. § 21. Even though the
effect of the Board's approval is to exempt the parties to a merger from the "antitrust laws,"
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Laying aside the effect of the American-Eastern merger on overall in-
dustry concentration, the impact on routes where the two airlines are
now in direct competition must be assessed. As a very general matter
American operates from the northeastern part of the country (including
such major points as New York, Boston, and Washington) southwest
through Chicago, Cincinnati, and St. Louis to Dallas and the West Coast.
Eastern operates mostly in a north-south direction, reaching Miami,
Atlanta, New Orleans, and Houston from such northern points as New
York, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Chicago, and St. Louis. Many of Eastern's
routes are concentrated in the southeastern quadrant, blanketing the
Carolinas, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida. Viewed in this manner merger
between the two companies seems to threaten no loss in competition. But
a closer look at the routes indicates several areas where they are in direct
competition.
Most of their face-to-face competition comes in the northeastern area,
between such cities as Boston, Providence, Hartford, New York, Phila-
delphia, and Washington. But the two also compete in service between
points in that section and others in the central United States-such as
New York-Louisville and Boston-St. Louis-and within the central region
itself-such as Chicago-Indianapolis and Chicago-Cincinnati.
Table 9 arrays a number of the routes where the two airlines now
compete beginning with those where they provide the only service
(Houston-Cleveland)i or virtually all of it (New York-Louisville), to
those where they meet substantial competition from other airlines (Boston-
Washington). As is evident, on at least a dozen routes American and
Eastern provide the only competition; over another five American and
Eastern together carry 90% or more of the passenger traffic."' Obviously
in these cases merger will mean the elimination of all effective competi-
tion. While these routes vary greatly in the amount of traffic generated,
as indicated in Table 9, it cannot be denied that acceptance of this merger
means the acceptance of monopoly where competition (albeit duopolistic)
now reigns.
Even over routes where American and Eastern presently encounter
significant competition from other carriers, as between New York and
Washington, they nevertheless frequently account for the biggest chunk
of the traffic. While one frequently sees references to the large number of
carriers authorized to serve various of the northeast routes, the fact re-
mains that as to several of them American and Eastern are nevertheless
dominant-as in the case of New York-Boston, New York-Washington,
New York-Hartford, and Baltimore-New York. Here merger will mean
not only conferring on one carrier an effective monopoly, but, perhaps
even more important, the elimination of a substantial independent com-
petitor from the market. The significance of this seems particularly strik-
ing insofar as service along the upper eastern seaboard is concerned, for
it is here where, within only the last year, Eastern has shown particular
imagination with its inauguration of an air-shuttle service. While it is
there remains a serious question whether the Board can disregard section 7 in reaching its decision.
If it cannot, then section 7, which represents a greater hurdle than the monopoly proviso, must
also be satisfied before any merger can be authorized. So far the issue has not been satisfactorily
resolved.
.. A more comprehensive listing of routes on which American and Eastern now compete is
contained in exhibit BER-10. Exhibit AE-601 presentG similar information.
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TABLE 9. DIVISION OF PASSENGER TRAFFIC IN SELECTED
MARKETS WHERE AMERICAN AND EASTERN COMPETE
Total Revenue Passenger Percentage of Traffic
Market Miles in Millions, 1960* Carried byt
American Eastern Other
Houston-Cleveland 6.5 71 29
Louisville-Nashville 2.3 47 53
San Antonio-Hartford 3.5 334 67*
Syracuse-Baltimore 0.8 35 65
Syracuse-Louisville 0.8 47 53
San Antonio-Philadelphia 9.5 31 69
San Antonio-Providence 1.2 40 60
Charleston-Chicago 3.2 50 46 4
New York-Louisville 40.0 32 63 5
Charleston, W. Va.-Washington 4.6 38 57 5
Hartford-Louisville 1.7 13t* 81t* 6t
Chicago-Indianapolis 17.6 28 65 7
Hartford-New York 10.3 58 30 12
Boston-Louisville 6.6 17 71 12
New York-Providence 18.0 69 15 26
Philadelphia-Roanoke 1.5 s0 25 25
New York-Boston 167.0 25 48 27
Hartford-Washington 10.0 7 65 28
Hartford-St. Louis 5.4 70 1 29
New York-Washington 149.0 27 43 30
Boston-St. Louis 22.0 62 8 30
Baltimore-New York 13.2 9 55 36
Houston-San Antonio 8.7 15 44 41
Nashville-San Antonio 2.1 40 15 45
New York-San Antonio 52.0 4 45 51
Chicago-Cincinnati 22.5 32 13 55
Washington-San Antonio 20.3 9 35 56
Boston-Washington 67.0 11 17 72
Sources: * CAB. Domestic Origin-Destination Survey of Airline Passenger Traffic, Summary Date
(1961).
t CAB. Competition Among Domestic Air Carriers, 3d Quarter 1961, unless otherwise
noted.
* Same as note "'j"," but for 2d Quarter 1961.
pleasant to think that this spirit might come to imbue American Airlines
after the merger, it is more realistic to note that American has not chosen
to follow Eastern's step, in fact has ridiculed it, and might very well kill
it. As has been suggested earlier, there is distinct public advantage in pre-
serving as many independent competitors as possible; better to retain
American and Eastern as rivals in route-markets already highly con-
centrated rather than bless their marriage because some competition would
remain. All of the evidence, therefore, points to the conclusion that this
merger will eliminate significant actual and potential competition as well
as create monopoly on a number of routes.
The full implications of the American-Eastern merger cannot be ap-
preciated, however, solely by looking at those markets where they pre-
sently are in competition. It is necessary to assess the significance of the
fact that their consolidation will bring together the second and fourth
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largest domestic trunk airlines and hence permit integration of their
systems in such a way as to create a powerful new force within the in-
dustry. In a sense this will increase the extent of competition (in areas
of low traffic volume); but it is more likely to divert traffic away from
the weaker lines and hence further imbalance the industry. The reason
for this stems from an analogy to the Gestalt effect-the whole being
greater than the sum of the parts. Though they do compete over many
routes, these two carriers by and large cover different sections of the coun-
try and can move traffic from any given location to any other on their
unified system via any of 30 gateway cities. What this can mean, vis-a-vis
other carriers, was noted by the CAB in 1946 when it refused to permit
American to acquire Mid-Continent Airlines, the latter operating north-
south from Minneapolis-St. Paul to Texas and New Orleans. The Board
admitted that there was little direct competition between the two; but
it feared that American, because of the great breadth of its operations,
could undesirably distort the competitive situation in respect to the
acquired routes. The Board explained:
[T]he wider the geographical scope of a carrier's operations in comparison
with a particular rival, the greater the competitive advantage which it will
enjoy through its control of traffic originating at or destined to points to
which the other carrier does not have access. Because of this fact, the exten-
sion of a carrier's system may enable it to divert a substantial amount of
traffic from a competing carrier without at the same time rendering a service
more attuned to the public convenience and necessity."'
The way in which this can work is easily seen. Braniff Airways, for
example, now carries a considerable volume of passengers to points on its
system which originate at points served by Eastern Air Lines. In many
cases American Airlines could destinate the passenger just as well as
Braniff. But at the moment Braniff has an equal opportunity with Ameri-
can to secure this traffic. When the merger takes effect, however, it is
reasonable to expect that most of this kind of business would be internally
"captured" and routed entirely over the combined entity. The significance
of this is apparent when it is noted that in January, 1962, alone, Braniff
received revenues of about $1 million just for service it gave to points on
its line, also served by American, that was originated by Eastern.12 Many
similar examples could be recited, but their lesson would be precisely the
same: when two major airline systems are consolidated, the tendency is
to deprive other transporters, equally capable of providing the service, of
the opportunity. This would be true of freight traffic as well. On cargo
now moved between California and points in the southeastern United
States the Flying Tiger Line (an all-cargo domestic operator) now pro-
vides much of the service; but upon their merger it is anticipated that
much of this business would be taken over by American-Eastern."'
1197 C.A.B. 365, 378-79 (1946).
120Exhibit BN-10. American seeks to rebut this fear by showing the number of passengers
who could have completed their trip via American but did so via Braniff. Exhibit AE-1250.
The point has some merit, but with the far greater range of coverage held by a combined
American-Eastern it is rather obvious that Braniff has a far greater risk of loss, both relatively
and absolutely.
12' Exhibit FTL-1. In 1961 about 27% of the Flying Tiger Line's interlined freight was with
Eastern; but since American is competitive with FTL over most of the latter's routes, the preponder-
ance of this freight can be expected to move via American-Eastern.
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The contemplated merger would also make possible new, through-
service between many cities which presently require at least a single
change of planes. This is a mixed blessing, offering some public advantage
(though not as much as might at first appear) but raising the spectre
of unjustifiable competition over routes which American Airlines itself
would otherwise consider too limited in traffic to justify. To take the
rosier side first, some 553 city-pairs could receive their first single carrier
connecting service as a consequence of the American-Eastern merger.
Not all of these, of course, will actually receive this service for the
simple reason that they develop far too little passenger volume. In fact,
of the 553 city pairs, only 39 offer more than an average of one pas-
senger per day in each direction. The following are among the more im-
portant points that would receive their first single-carrier authorization:
Detroit-Nashville
Cleveland-Montgomery
El Paso-Miami, New Orleans
Charlotte, N. C.-Tulsa, Oklahoma City, El Paso
Huntsville-Los Angeles, San Francisco
Los Angeles-Raleigh (and other Carolina points)
Phoenix-Atlanta, New Orleans, Mobile
Oklahoma City-various points in Florida
San Francisco-Atlanta, Raleigh
In short, after the merger, if the service is actually made available, a
passenger could fly aboard the same plane from Detroit to Nashville (not
necessarily nonstop), or the other points indicated, where a change of
planes (and airlines) must now be made. There is undeniable public
improvement in this possibility, though it deserves emphasis that the city-
pairs which are in this category involve relatively few people (the largest,
Detroit-Nashville, averages only 12 passengers a day in each direction).
Furthermore, the merger would also permit direct, through-plane serv-
ice between a number of cities already receiving service from at least one
other carrier. It is this possibility that presents the greatest danger-
threatening to harm seriously a number of weaker airlines and to enhance
the American-Eastern industry position. All of the markets so affected
provide significant amounts of passenger traffic, but far below the volume
generated on routes where American Airlines presently insists competi-
tion is unjustified. Here is a list of some of the city-pairs which American-
Eastern could serve directly on a through-plane basis that already receive
nonstop service from another airline:
Atlanta-Los Angeles, San Francisco
Miami-Los Angeles, San Francisco
Jacksonville/Orlando-Los Angeles, San Francisco
Birmingham-Los Angeles, San Francisco
Charlotte-Los Angeles, San Francisco
Caribbean (San Juan)-West Coast points
Detroit-Memphis
New Orleans-West Coast points
122 For an indication of the kinds of new service the merger will permit, see exhibit BER-1
and the American-Eastern response to the CAD'$ Bureau of Carriers Information Request No.
20, p. 1.
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In each case American-Eastern would be required to make one stop en
route and in some situations this would require some deviation from the
most direct path (this, though, would not exceed about 100 miles). 1 '
How important these modest restrictions would turn out to be cannot
be accurately predicted; carriers required to stop en route competing
against nonstop rivals usually are disadvantaged, but American, apparent-
ly because of the goodwill and customer loyalty it has established, seems
able to do well in spite of such conditions. Indeed, if the merger is ap-
proved, American plans immediately to inaugurate jet service between
most of the points indicated above-some evidence of its own confidence
in denting the markets.
Where the merger is likely to have its strongest competitive repercus-
sions is along the Southern Trancontinental Route, the subject of awards
by the CAB in 1961.12" At that time the Board chose National Airlines to
provide a nonstop service from Miami to California (with authorization
also to serve Houston and San Antonio) and granted Delta permission to
fly nonstop from Atlanta to California. In doing so the Board deliberately
preferred these weaker carriers to American, which had vigorously sought
either or both of these certifications. In commenting on American's ap-
plication the Board said:
The fact of the matter is that the grant of American's application for an
extension to Florida, coupled with its existing system, would give that
carrier a southern transcontinental route. Obviously, the impact of this
award to American would be such as to thwart the strengthening of Delta
and National which was the objective of our awards to those carriers."'
Put more straightforwardly, little more than a year ago the CAB ex-
pressly chose weaker carriers to provide service on the southern trans-
continental routes; it deliberately excluded American; yet if the pending
American-Eastern merger is approved without restriction American will
have gotten, through the back door, exactly what it was refused at the
front. Actually it appears that one of the major reasons why American
favors the merger with Eastern is the expectation that this will give it the
right to provide through service across the entire southern tier of states."'
.23 This can have an impact in other areas and under other conditions as well. Consider
the situation in respect to service between Washington and Minneapolis. Northwest, though
authorized to fly nonstop between these points, actually operates only one such flight a day
(it feels that traffic is too light to justify more than this). A combined American-Eastern could
operate through-plane service between the two cities via Chicago and thus compete on almost
an identical basis with Northwest, in spite of the fact the latter has a superficially stronger
award. See exhibit NWA-A, pp. 5-6, NWA-136.
124Southern Transcontinental Service Case, 1A Av. L. Rep. 5 21,131 (1961).
" Southern Transcontinental Service Case-Supplemental Opinion and Order on Reconsidera-
tion, 1A Av. L. Rep. 3 21,171 (1961). Pertinent also is the decision of Oct. 30, 1961, in which
the Board disapproved a lease agreement between American and Eastern calling for an interchange
of equipment at Chicago that would permit through-plane service between Florida and California.
The Board felt this arrangement would conflict with its Southern Transcontinental decision.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. and American Airlines, Inc.-Lease Agreement--Order Disapproving
Agreement, IA Av. L. Rep. 5 21,222 (1961).
12 Recently the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia set aside last year's CAB
award of the Dallas-Florida segment to Eastern, on the ground that it was not supported by
reasons and evidence that appear on the face of the record. Presumably the Board will again
reach the same decision on remand. But changes in circumstances might lead to a different result,
and conceivably the Board could thus prevent a merged American-Eastern from gaining a
southern transcontinental route. Wall Street Journal, May 25, 1962, p. 6, col. 4.
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The effect of the American-Eastern merger, therefore, would be to add
a strong new carrier to routes which, just a year ago, were felt by the
CAB to be best served individually by weaker trunklines. As one looks at
the traffic data there is considerable evidence to support the Board's de-
cision to confine through-carrier service along the southern transcon-
tinental routes to a single carrier. By comparison with most of the more
prominent markets in which competition was increased after 1955, the
southern tier markets are noticeably thin. For example, in 1955 the Board
opened up the Dallas-New York route to a second carrier; but this is a
sizeable market, developing 168 million revenue passenger miles in 1960.
By contrast none of the southern transcontinental routes generate this
much traffic; here are some examples, with traffic for 1960 expressed in






The two most heavily traversed routes thus produce only about half the
traffic that moves between Dallas and New York; and of these two, one
(Dallas-Los Angeles) is already competitive. Yet in each instance cited
a merged American-Eastern could provide additional, through-plane serv-
ice. Precisely what impact this would have is not easily determined. But
the CAB's Bureau of Economic Regulation has estimated that the merger
will divert $7.4 million from National Airlines and an additional $6.2
million from Delta, primarily as a result of service possibilities along the
southern transcontinental routes.127
There are other ways in which the merger might permit the parties to
expand their market position and exert their influence beyond what is
indicated simply by their consolidation. Some of these are difficult to
assess; their precise impact on other, smaller competitors is incalculable.
A few can be recited for purposes of illustration. For one, there is little
doubt that American possesses substantial good will and traveler ac-
ceptance that gives it an advantage over rivals, even where their service
is comparable. A large part of this, of course, may merely be due to its
far more extensive advertising and promotional efforts."' Moreover,
127Exhibits BER-5/6. The Bureau of Economic Regulation estimates that a combined Ameri-
can-Eastern would gain approximately $41 million in additional passenger revenue as a result
of the merger. Of this amount $23 million would come from service in the southern trans-
continental area and $18 million from other areas. Of the total amount roughly $17 million
would represent diversion from other carriers-the larger portion from National and Delta due
to their extensive operations along the southern transcontinental routes.
"'During the year ended Sept. 30, 1961, American spent approximately $6.1 million on
advertising, Eastern, an additional $5.5 million-in each instance more than any other airline
except United-Capital. On an available seat mile allocation, however, American spent only about
half as much as the smaller eight. Exhibit BER-25. While a combined American-Eastern may save
up to $3.5 million in advertising outlays over the sum of their separate expenditures (exhibit
AE-H-2), the other carriers are strongly of the view that the merged entity will have the
merchandising upper hand. See exhibits CAL-16; DL-50 ("it is a generally accepted fact that
the biggest carrier with the largest advertising budget and greatest exposure to the traveling
public has the inherent ability to attract more passengers in any given market"), p. 2. The argu-
ment of the smaller companies comes down to saying that the bigger rival gets proportionately
more "effect" for its dollar outlays. For other illustrations of this position, see Edwards, Con-
glomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in National Bureau of Economic Research, Business
Concentration and Price Policy (1955).
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American and Eastern together account for some 66% of the cards out-
standing under the Universal Air Travel Plan;129 this tends to provide
them with readier sales access to those business travelers who account for
over 25 ' of passenger revenues collected through this credit system. In
the larger cities, served by more than a single airport, the giant airline
also would have a distinct advantage. In New York, for example, Ameri-
can and Eastern operate through all three of the city's terminals. This
means that a passenger, arriving at one of the airports and required to
change to another airline to finish his journey, more probably will select
American for this completion leg than some other, smaller airline which
also supplies the service but which operates from another airport. As an
example: someone flying from a medium-size New England city to New
York's La Guardia field, for onward movement to Detroit, will find that
Northwest Airlines operates only from Idlewild and Newark. American,
however, which likewise provides service between New York and Detroit,
operates from all three fields. The typical passenger is quite likely, there-
fore, to select American over Northwest.13 And the merger will insulate
this process, offering more service to more points.
The potential advantage of American-Eastern is perhaps most readily
seen through an examination of its equipment pool. By the end of this
year, for example, American-Eastern would have about 31% of the
country's jet fleet. In conjunction with the seasonality of their opera-
tions-American with peak demand in the summer, Eastern in the win-
ter- rather clearly the merged company will be in a position to increase
substantially the amount of service already being given on routes which
they serve. In the winter, for instance, Eastern could literally flood the
New York-Miami route with jet flights-far in excess of the number that
its two competitors could offer."s This would give it a marked advantage,
for it is well-established that the carrier offering the larger number of
flights typically becomes the market leader. 3 In fact, this is already true on
the New York-Miami run, ostensibly because of Eastern's more frequent
service. This would be greatly accentuated in the event of merger with
American. To listen to the pleas of the two airlines, however, one would
think that in each other's off-season, the unnecessary flight equipment
would be put in storage; this they admit is not contemplated, which im-
plies that they will use the equipment to provide stepped-up service over
"I UATP contracts are entered into between individual airlines and contracting concerns.
Though the cards supplied can be used on any participating carrier, all transactions are handled
by the original contracting airline. American reportedly makes duplicates of bills it renders and
turns them over to its sales personnel; aggressively exploited this can be of advantage in offering
assistance in reservations, plannis.g or adjusting flight departure times, etc. The other airlines
feel that American, in particular, gains many benefits through its dominant role in the UATP.
See exhibits DL-S/51; BER-26; BN-A, BN-6/7.
... See exhibits NWA-130 and NWA-A, pp. 6-7. The gargantuan size of new terminals also
tends to give the airline providing through-plane service an advantage over those which provide
an interchange service requiring a change of planes. At Chicago's O'Hare field, for example, a
passenger transferring from American to Northwest must proceed nearly Y3 of a mile; accordingly
the minimum connecting time differential between a scheduled arrival and departure at O'Hare
is now 50 minutes. To the passenger who can do so, therefore, it is faster to go via the
through-service airline; this could reduce over-all flight time by at least 30 minutes.
... And Eastern is known for taking just this kind of action. In 1959, for example, it dis-
tributed a memorandum, marked "confidential," which outlined "a positive offensive action of
smothering the competition with schedules." Exhibit DL-36D, p. 1.
32 The close correlation between the number of flights offered and the share of traffic carried
is shown in exhibits BER-11/15.
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higher-volume routes. The impact of this on the weaker carriers is ob-
vious; either they would be forced to acquire additional equipment, at a
higher cost than American-Eastern pay in the capital market,'33 and with
a consequent rise in capacity (something hardly to be encouraged), or
have their share of the relevant markets appreciably reduced. This ability
to shift a massive, diversified equipment fleet from area to area indeed
appears to be one of the merged company's greatest sources of strength.
Its exertion can only reasonably be expected to enlarge the consolidated
airline's place in the market beyond that which merger alone would confer.
Mention of the internal advantages of a large equipment pool, how-
ever, raises a crucial question: might not a merged American-Eastern,
because of its greater size, not represent a substantial gain in efficiency,
with the lower costs inuring in some way to public advantage. This is
simply a variant of the old theme: aren't the biggest companies the more
efficient? The answer is no, whether it be steel or airlines. Those who have
looked closely at the problem conclude that airline efficiency correlates,
not with the size of the firm, but with exogenous factors, particularly
the density of the route and the average length of haul. The Koontz'34
and Wheatcroft"' studies have found few, if any, economies of scale
beyond the level attained by the medium or medium-small companies.
Moreover, beyond the middle-size range significant diseconomies appear
to set in. Thus in 1960 TWA and American Airlines ranked, respectively,
first and second in average length of hop (reflecting their generally longer
flights), and third and first in passenger load factor; still they held only
the fifth and seventh places in terms of total operating expense per avail-
able ton mile."' It is indeed a mistake to think that size and efficiency
are directly related; they are not. Other factors are more important, and
at some point size may become a disadvantage-in terms of efficiency
although it may be useful to the possessor. A merger of American and
Eastern would unite already large carriers; in some respects it would
permit fuller exploitation of existing traffic; but more generally it would
link together carriers with noncompetitive routes and hence contribute
little to more favorable operating circumstances. In short, it promises
little in the way of increased operating efficiency.
American and Eastern claim that their merger will permit other
kinds of economies which make their consolidation meritorious. Merger,
they insist, will permit the elimination of duplicate terminal and ticket
facilities, allow consolidation of hangars and repair centers, reduce capital
requirements, etc. The table below summarizes the claimed pretax
savings:
"..As of December 31, 1961, the average interest cost on outstanding debt of the biggest
three airlines (excluding TWA) was 4.52%; for the seven smaller airlines, 5.41%. Exhibit
DL-32, p. 1. Eastern has been able to borrow from major New York banks at attractive interest
rates. Presently it has outstanding $80 million in such bank loans. Of this, $60 million is due
1963-65, bearing interest of 2 of 1% above the prime commercial rate; $20 million is due in
1964, bearing interest of /4 of 1% above the prime rate. Eastern Proxy Statement, March 12,
1962, p. 37.
134 Koontz, Domestic Air Line Self-Sufficiency: A Problem of Route Structure, 42 Am. Econ.
Rev. 103 (1952). He found that only four of the airlines, at the time of his study, were at a
serious cost disadvantage on account of their size. Of these, two have since disappeared (Colonial
and Inland) and one, Northeast, in spite of CAB attempts at resuscitation, is bankrupt. The other,
Continental, has been substantially improved in recent years through new long-haul awards.
135 Wheatcroft, The Economics of European Air Transport, ch. I1 (1956).
' Exhibit JI-1, p. 34.
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TABLE 10. AMERICAN-EASTERN, CLAIMED SAVINGS
AS A RESULT OF MERGER
Amount of Savings
(in thousands)
Item 1962 level 1964 level
Depreciation $ 8,269
Interest 5,796
Advertising $ 3,000 3,500
Electronic Data Processing Requirements 906 2,792
Flying Hours Saved 13,037 14,379
Rentals and Utilities 3,586 7,862
Management Overhead, Outside Services, and
Other Common Station Savings 11,000 12,100
$31,259 $54,698
Source: Joint Response to Bureau of Carriers Digest No. 32, second rev., p. 1
Unquestionably these economies are impressive, if realized. How realistic
they are remains open to serious doubt, however. Both parties currently
use ticket and other facilities that are held under long-term lease-as in
the case of terminal and hangar leases at O'Hare Field in Chicago, for
example, that do not expire until 1998."' In such a case it is doubtful if
any real savings can be affected. There are other similar examples, but
all suggest that it will be a good deal more difficult to achieve as many
savings as are claimed. Moreover, some of the savings were in reach before
the merger was agreed to. For instance, of the $13 million reduction in
flying costs that is forecast, more than 92% comes from a reduction of
39,003 ramp hours in the use of Eastern's Constellation equipment. But
Delta Airlines, in its intervening argument against the merger, contends
that of Eastern's 76,000 ramp hours on this type of equipment in 1961,
60,000 could have been eliminated without merger simply through more
intensive equipment utilization.3" While this counter-claim itself is open
to question, it raises some considerable doubt as to the extent of the
economies that will actually be achieved as a result of merger.
In some respects, however, it is rather amazing how few the economies
will be. Eastern and American state they now have firm contracts calling
for the delivery of 65 Boeing three-engine jet 727 transports. Merger will
permit this number to be cut, but by only six in number, rather modest
indeed. 39 This evidences either an unspoken belief by the parties in a rise
in passenger traffic over the near term or the small amount of benefit that
the merger will actually bring about.
But to the extent the merger does represent possible dollar savings, one
is struck by the great extent to which these economies could be realized
without outright consolidation. Where the two airlines presently operate,
e.g., separate ticket offices in a given city, it does not require merger of
their corporations to achieve joint use of common facilities. In fact,
already Eastern and American share a ticket office in the Statler Hotel in
Dallas. There are probably similar examples elsewhere, and there is no
reason why this simple arrangement could not be extended widely.
13 Eastern Proxy Statement, March 12, 1962, pp. 19, 23. There are other similar illustrations.
... Exhibit DL-37D, p. 1.
"' Aviation Week, May 28, 1962, p. 41.
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American and Eastern will combine their hangar requirements at Dallas
in the event of merger; but this could be done anyway. And in fact
why could this sort of practice not encompass several airlines? Recently
a number of airlines announced they had created a spare parts pool, which
offers savings of over $2 million annually. This could readily be extended
to hangars, repair facilities, ground equipment (such as tractors, loading
devices, etc.), and even perhaps to terminal check-in and processing
operations. One indeed wonders why Eastern Air Lines requires a $14
million passenger terminal of its own at Idlewild, and American another
valued at $21 million. It does not require clairvoyance to suggest the
wisdom and practicability of having joint terminals, akin to the union
stations operated by the railroads in major cities. After all, a man and
woman can economize by sharing the expenses of driving to work with-
out getting married.
C. Summary
All factors considered, and admittedly they do not all point in the
same direction, the American-Eastern merger has little to commend it
and much to recommend its rejection. Its consummation would signifi-
cantly increase the overall level of concentration within the airline in-
dustry, a combined American-Eastern accounting for at least a third of
total passenger traffic. Within a number of markets the competitive effect
would be even more severe. Between several cities American and Eastern
now provide the only service; merger would clearly mean monopoly in
these cases. Over still other routes, where one or more other carriers are
in competition, American-Eastern would clearly be the dominant airline,
carrying more than two-thirds of the traffic in many instances. Moreover,
due to the advantages possessed by the merged entity, particularly the
ability to shift a massive, diversified equipment fleet from route to route,
the long-run result would probably be to increase American-Eastern's
share of the market at the expense of the industry's smaller airlines. Con-
sequently, their consolidation would run counter to the Board's past de-
cisions dealing with mergers (particularly as reflected in the United-
Western and American-Mid-Continent acquisition cases) as well as to
its recent policy of increasing competition within the industry.
It is true, however, that while the contemplated merger would kill some
competition, in some areas it would increase the degree of competition.
While this generally is a desirable quality, it is important to note that the
markets affected in this case-largely lying within the southern tier
states-are predominantly of low traffic yield. Only a year ago the CAB
determined they were too small to support two competitive services and
acted deliberately so as to prevent American from gaining a southern
transcontinental route. It bears re-emphasis that American Airlines has
argued with particular vehemence that the cause of recently depressed
airline earnings lies in excessive competition. Yet the very markets which
American suggests are unduly competitive generate far more traffic than
the bulk of the markets where the American-Eastern merger would mean
the addition of a particularly strong competitor. Moreover, although
American insists that excessive competition is primarily responsible for
recent airline financial troubles (a matter disputed earlier), its merger
with Eastern goes only a very short distance in alleviating the condition.
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For the sake of curtailing competition between a number of high-density
markets in the upper Atlantic seaboard area and a few elsewhere the
merger would bring together two large carriers that generally are not
in direct competition with one another. Thus, even assuming for the sake
of argument that the American argument is valid, the contemplated
merger does not represent its concrete application. American indeed seems
to have fallen between two stools. It can't have it both ways; nor, for
that matter, can the CAB.
Of the substantial dollar savings claimed by the parties to the Ameri-
can-Eastern merger (and there is some considerable doubt whether they
can be completely realized) the great preponderance can be achieved with-
out outright consolidation. To combine ticket sales offices, or hangars, or
terminal loading equipment, or spare parts, or most anything-including
flight equipment itselfl' 5-a merger is unnecessary. What economies the
American-Eastern merger holds out thus can largely be accomplished
without merger. Accordingly, as long as merger means, as it does here,
the loss in some competition and the risk that the level of concentration
will be still further increased, it is difficult to come to any other conclusion
than that the planned consolidation is, to paraphrase the words of the
statute, inconsistent with the public interest.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whenever an industry is beset by financial troubles a search begins for
the devil. Commonly "excessive" competition fills the bill and mergers
provide the means of exhortation. This is no less true of the airlines-
their officials and regulators-than of other industries. To those seeking
a simple, quick "solution" corporate consolidation indeed represents a
temptation difficult to resist. Closer analysis suggests, however, that un-
due competition is not the culprit, that more fundamental, more elusive
factors provide the explanation and that a cure for the airlines' plight
will require more reflection, more information and above all more imagi-
nation than has heretofore been displayed either by the carriers or their
government overseers. Under such conditions it would be the gravest of
errors to think that mergers will, as a general matter, provide any lasting
answer. Their approval, as the pending American-Eastern amalgamation
well demonstrates, would lessen competition and threaten to increase the
prevailing degree of concentration without offering any significant public
benefits that could not otherwise be achieved.
Although the domestic trunk airline industry has suffered notable
financial troubles in recent years (though less serious than commonly
portrayed), the available evidence, fairly interpreted, suggests strongly
that the near future will record substantial improvements. So far this
year passenger traffic has been increasing at a rate indicating about a 10%
rise in revenue miles compared with 1961. Although the load factor con-
tinues to fall, the greater operating efficiency of the jet along with the
slackened pace of equipment acquisitions indicates that the current traffic
140 There are many examples of equipment interchange and lease arrangements. See, e.g.,
New York-Houston Interchange Case, 16 C.A.B. 602 (1952). Generally, Winkelhake, Inter-
change Service Among the Airlines of the United States, 22 J. Air L. & Com. 1 (1955).
Interestingly the Board itself, at an early date, recognized that an interchange of equipment
might be acceptable where an outright consolidation would not. Compare United-Western
acquisition, supra note 106, with United-Western interchange, supra note 115.
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increases will lead to substantial profits for the industry as a whole during
the current calendar year. And as long as the economy continues its up-
ward movement, there is excellent reason to believe that 1963 will be an
even better year. Looking back, if there is a single leading explanation for
the industry's recent decline in earnings it is the failure of passenger
traffic to grow since 1959 at the rate recorded in prior years. This, in turn,
is related in part to the 1960-1961 recession and in part to the sharp fare
hikes which have been placed in effect since 1958 (up by roughly 25 %
during the past four years). If the airlines' generally overzealous pur-
chases of jet equipment is also considered, it is fair to say that much of the
financial problem stems from their own miscalculations.
To place the blame for the decline in earnings on "excessive" competi-
tion, as many of the leading airline and regulatory officials are doing,
hence seems particularly inappropriate. No doubt the increased competi-
tion stemming from the CAB's route awards of the last seven years has
accentuated the problem. But it has not been an efficient cause. Recession,
heavy investment in jet aircraft coupled with the high costs of introduc-
tion, a general decline in traffic at least partly the result of fare hikes, and
a miscellany of other factors (e.g., work stoppages due to labor disputes)
can far more reasonably be identified as the explanations for slackened
airline earnings. And, despite a lack of comment on the point from within
the industry, some of these forces are not beyond the influence of the
carriers. Reliable evidence indicates that traffic growth correlates with
airline fares and that raising fares only curtails the traffic essential to
financial success. Thus economic wisdom here clearly calls for markedly
lower fares capable of attracting the attention of the 80% or more of
the American people who have never traveled aboard a commercial air-
liner. This seems to be the proper next step for industry action, with the
Continental proposal of an economy rate 25% below the coach fare a
good point of origin.
All things considered, mergers offer little of real benefit. While in
some ways they would inhibit competition, this does not appear to be
the cause of the airline industry's troubles. To sanction mergers in this
context therefore, would be primarily to deprive the public of a quality
that offers substantial advantages. Although rivalry here is of a limited
variety, nevertheless there are compelling arguments for preserving as
large as possible a number of independent competitors. Not only has ex-
perience shown this as leading to a wide range of important service and
equipment benefits, but it has contributed to price advantages as well
(Eastern's air-shuttle and air-bus innovations are examples, as are some
of the novel fare offers of National). The creation of monopoly and the
substantial lessening of competition is too big a price to pay for the
achievement of so little."1
But to discount heavily the utility of mergers as a "solution" to the
airlines' financial difficulties (to the extent those difficulties may not be
141 Among the other writers who share this general conclusion are Healy, The Merger Movement
in Transportation, 52 Am. Econ. Rev. 436 (Supp. May 1962); Maclay and Burt, Entry of New
Carriers Into Domestic Trunkline Air Transportation, 22 J. Air L. & Com. 131 (1955); Keyes,
A Reconsideration of Federal Control of Entry Into Air Transportation, 22 J. Air L. & Com. 192
(1955). But there are those who are concerned that the prevailing degree of competition in the
industry may be unwise and unwarranted. See Frederick, Commercial Air Transportation 180-181,
195-202 (4th ed. 1955); Gill and Bates, supra note 64, at p. 631; Koontz, supra note 134, at
123-24.
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only temporary), is not to say that certain kinds of action should not be
taken immediately to improve the industry's financial prospects. First,
the airlines should begin immediately to experiment with markedly lower
fares-sufficiently far below the prevailing levels and kept in force for
a period long enough to permit reasoned assessment of their market effect.
The CAB should encourage this action and not be disturbed if the fares
charged do not cover fully-allocated costs; it can usually be presumed
that the airlines will not provide service at rates below the incremental
operating expenses incurred.'42 It bears emphasis too, that such fare experi-
ments should be conducted before a serious consideration is given to the
curtailment of competition (whether via merger or otherwise), not after,
as Chairman Alan Boyd recently implied.
Second, the airlines, prompted by the CAB, should immediately seek
out new ways of reducing costs through joint facility operations. It con-
tinues to make little sense for the various airlines, individually, to operate
ticket offices, maintain hangars, and so forth, when these can be easily
shared. This seems particularly true in the case of functions less "visible"
to the public. One recent step involved the pooling of spare parts. That
could be extended to hangars, repair facilities, and other behind-the-
scenes operations. Joint use of electronic data processing equipment for
reservations and related purposes is clearly feasible; indeed it appears that
Eastern's EDP facilities are more than ample to take care of both its own
and American's needs as well. Interline leasing of flight equipment already
is common; the principle deserves wider appreciation. Unquestionably
there can be a large reduction in overall airline costs without the very
substantial loss in competition that consolidations of the various com-
panies would inevitably entail.
Third, the CAB should immediately undertake a study to determine
how much the trunk airlines are losing through their operation of serv-
ice along various low-density routes. Indications are that these losses are
substantial and hence, if reduced, might ease the airlines' economic situa-
tion considerably. 4 ' Northeast Airlines, for example, contends that if it
is allowed to abandon service to seven small New England airports it can
save from $1 million to $1.5 million a year. " There are similar indica-
tions contained in the efforts of other airlines to give up service to selected
low-volume points; American Airlines is presently seeking to suspend its
operations at such places as Akron, Ohio; Douglas, Arizona; Midland/
Odessa, Texas; Joplin and Springfield, Missouri; and Peoria, Illinois. "'
42 The more enlightened airline officials know full well that if additional traffic provides
sufficient revenue to cover the out-of-pocket expenses incurred, it can be worthwhile-contributing
to the payment of diverse overhead charges. The CAB, however, seems intent on requiring a given
service to cover all costs. See supra note 98. This unwisely inhibits the very kind of promotional
pricing that the Board and others advocate. See, e.g., the Report of Project Horizon, supra note 15,
at 190-95.
... In 1956 the Air Transport Association acknowledged that many points served by the
trunk airlines are truly unproductive and, absent enrichment from other routes, would require
subsidy. Finding that to avoid subsidy a given location must enplane at least 57 passengers per
day (which seems rather high), the ATA concluded, for example, that one-third of the points
served by American in the last half of 1955 represented losses. For the other airlines the proportion
was even higher: 617 for Braniff, 53% for Delta, 43% for TWA and United. Hearings Before
the House Antitrust Subcommittee, Monopoly Problems in the Regulated Industries: Airlines,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), vol. 3, pp. 1653-55.
.. Wall Street Journal, May 23, 1962, p. 13, col. 2.
'0 Joint Response to BC Information Request No. 31, p. 22.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Some suggest that one of the major reasons for Eastern Air Line's troubles
has been its unwillingness to abandon a large number of points that gene-
rate revenue far below the probable related costs. In fact, on occasion
Eastern has remained in competition with subsidized local-service car-
riers. " ' At this juncture, however, no one is certain of the magnitude of
the losses involved in trunk line operations to such small-volume loca-
tions; this should be determined.
It would seem only wise to permit the trunk airlines to abandon service
with far greater freedom than they have at present. To force the trunk
carriers to provide service in cases where local service airlines would be
subsidized is absurd. This only means that the richer routes (and the
travelers involved) must provide sufficient profits from which the cost
of unproductive service can be recouped. As well, this makes it more
difficult to sustain competition in the bigger markets. " 7 Let it be admitted
that service abandonments by the trunk lines means that many com-
munities would have to depend on feeder carriers for their air service and
that subsidy payments might have to be increased. "" This should not be
alarming; economic common-sense dictates that if markets do not pro-
vide sufficient revenue to cover the costs of a given service, they can
rationally only be served (and that appears to be the Congressional de-
mand) at a price. And better that price be direct subsidy than that it be
a hidden subsidy drained from operations in wealthier markets.
Fourth, the CAB should also begin a careful review of the various routes
on which it has made additional competitive awards during the last seven
years with a view to determining the adequacy of the traffic involved to
sustain the existing degree of competition. Necessarily this would entail
a specification of the Board's objectives in encouraging competition and
a consideration of the effect of the increased traffic that most of the routes
will generate this year. Such a review could give the Board a useful op-
portunity to consider the consistency of its actions in recent years. As
was indicated in part II of this article, the CAB failed to take this kind
of action at the time it made the various awards. The result is that there
is little meaningful correlation between the number of airlines authorized
to serve a given route and the level of traffic involved. Many incongruities
are apparent. "' Some routes with low traffic volume have been granted two
unrestricted authorizations; others with even heavier traffic remain mono-
polized. Two carriers each serve St. Louis-Miami and New York-Dallas;
yet in 1960 the former generated only about 25 o of the revenue passenger
miles of the latter. It would thus seem either that there should be more
competition in some markets or less in others. At some point the Board
should take its stand, publicly and explicitly spelling out its criteria. But
until it conducts an inquiry of this type, in conjunction with a study of
14' Some 737o of the stations served by Eastern that produced passenger revenue of less than
$1 million in 1961 were acquired subsequent to the original grandfather grants. Exhibit NAL-304.
However, in 1961 Eastern disposed of its local-service type routes in upstate New York to
Mohawk Airlines, a feeder carrier. (These routes had been acquired in 1956 by Eastern when
it purchased Colonial Airlines.) Eastern-Mohawk Transfer Case, 1A Av. L. Rep. 5 21,200 (1961).
147 See Richmond, suspra note 64, at 253-56.
14' Not necessarily, though. In calculating subsidy payments for local-service carriers the
CAB now uses a so-called class rate formula which has the effect of submerging the results of
individual station operations in overall system operations. See Local Service Class Subsidy Rate
Investigation, 1A Av. L. Rep. 5 21,134 (1961).
... This matter is considered in detail by Richmond, supra note 64, ch. IX-X.
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the matter of internal subsidization (outlined above) and its relationship
to the question of trunk airline earnings, the Board cannot make intel-
ligent decisions in respect to the tolerable level of competition. Even
worse, lacking essential information and without a comprehensive policy,
the Board might grasp at mergers as a way of easing the industry's difficul-
ties. This would be a grievous error, for airline consolidations generally,
that of American and Eastern in particular, promise to contribute little to
the resolution of the industry's basic economic problems, yet are sure to
deny the public the substantial advantages of competition.
